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Abstract
Impact and Benefits Agreements (IBAs) are arrangements between indigenous 
communities and industry to secure long-term local benefits from resource development 
projects. These local benefits include matters such as employment, training, economic 
development, business opportunities, social, cultural and community services, environmental 
protection, and cash payments. Despite the increasing use of IB As in remote regions such as 
Alaska and the northern regions of Australia, Canada and Russia only limited information is 
available about key requirements for successful IBAs. This thesis presents a case study 
undertaken in collaboration with the Ross River Dena First Nation (Yukon). The study 
analyses the success of two IBAs negotiated by the Ross River Dena for mineral projects, 
through the use of a theoretical IBA framework developed from a review of current IBA 
literature. As the two analysed IBAs differed in outcomes, it was possible to suggest criteria 
for success and failure of the agreements. These criteria can be used as hypotheses in further 
study and issues of caution for other indigenous groups entering IBA negotiations with 
industry.
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Introduction 
Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland ...
In his report i V o / f norr/zem TTig rgport q/^ rAg Moctg/izZg
VhZZgy f  ZpgZmg /nqwZr}', Berger (1977) explored the perception of remote regions as 
'frontiers' versus 'homelands' where frontier was described as the last frontier waiting to he 
conquered while also being the home of a people who are socially, culturally and
economically dependent upon the land. Berger went to northern indigenous communities to 
learn about their concerns regarding the pipeline, as he set out to investigate the possible 
environmental impacts of a proposed pipeline project crossing the North-American Arctic 
from Alaska to the western Northwest Territories. Yet, Berger did not merely follow the 
initial goal of assessing the direct environmental impacts of the pipeline. He expanded its 
scope to include direct and indirect socio-economic impacts the pipeline would cause to the 
northern people. As a result, Berger initiated a national discussion of the perceptions and 
rights of the Canadian indigenous peoples living in remote northern areas. As such, this 
inquiry started the development of a new understanding of the challenges faced by Canadian 
indigenous communities when encountering large-scale resource development projects. 
Berger concluded his report by suggesting a 10-year moratorium on the building of the 
Mackenzie Valley Pipehne to allow for the settlement of land claims and thus, for indigenous 
communities to gain control over their destiny.
Although written in the late 1970s, Berger's report has not lost its relevance to current 
debates about resource development versus the protection of indigenous communities, not 
only in Canada, but also other regions around the globe. These regions include, among 
others, Alaska, northern Russia and northern regions of Australia. The indigenous people
living in these areas belong to culturally distinct groups, such as the Anindilyakwa (northern 
Australia), Dene/Dena, Gwich'in, Inuit (northern Canada), Inupiat (Alaska), Khanty, Mansi, 
Sami and Yukagir (northern Russia). Jackson (1991) states:
Generalization [about indigenous peoples] should be made cautiously, given 
the great variation in ecological setting, history and type o f contact 
undergone ... Nevertheless, all these peoples share a position at the end of 
the scale o f socio-techno-political com plexity opposite from  that occupied 
by the vast state and m ultinational institutions contacting them. In many 
respects this shared position makes the crucial difference. (Jackson, J„ 
quoted in O ’Faircheallaigh, 1991)
This holds true for the above mentioned indigenous groups. While these groups are culturally 
distinct, located in different ecological settings and situated within different nation states, 
they tend to share similar experiences with resource development endeavours on their 
traditional territories (O’Faircheallaigh, 1991). Reasons for these similar experiences are, 
among other things, their shared standpoint within the greater nation state: being minority 
groups in remote areas which have to stand up to government and industry to balance the 
possible positive as well as negative resource development impacts on their communities and 
lands.
Resource development is a double-edged sword for indigenous peoples in remote 
northern regions. Often, it is the communities' only source of wage income. Wage income, in 
turn, enables indigenous people to purchase hunting equipment (e.g. snowmobiles, gasoline, 
guns and ammunition), and to finance traditional activities and ceremonies. Consequently, 
from a positive perspective, resource development can increase and improve indigenous 
communities' abilities to follow traditional activities. However, experiences in the past have 
demonstrated that resource development, from a negative perspective, can cause tremendous 
repercussions for indigenous peoples, for example the destruction of local traditional 
economies, and the disruption of families and community ties. Thus, development activities
must be planned and guided from a community point of view, whereby negative impacts are 
mitigated and positive impacts are reinforced.
Over the past six decades, the indigenous peoples of remote regions have experienced 
different attempts to conduct resource development in an economically, politically and/or 
culturally appropriate maimer with varying, but mostly limited success. The approaches 
taken were dependent upon the political, economic, and social context of the time and place 
(Alaska, northern Australia, northern Canada and Russia). At present, indigenous groups 
throughout these regions are struggling for political and economic autonomy to create 
development approaches which are more sensitive to their economic, social and political 
culture. Presently, one of the approaches relied upon by many of these indigenous groups are 
Impact and Benefits Agreements (IBAs). These agreements are commonly negotiated 
between Indigenous communities and developers and aim to provide short and long-term 
benefits for local residents from resource development projects located in the vicinity of their 
communities. IBAs are widely used in the North American North and northern Australia, and 
increasingly in the Russian North. Despite their frequent use by indigenous communities to 
secure benefits from large-scale renewable as well as non-renewable resource developments, 
little is known about the actual success of these agreements.
This thesis aims to increase the understanding of IBAs by examining two case 
studies: the Faro Mine and Kudz Ze Kayah (KZK) IBAs negotiated in the 1990s by the Ross 
River Dena. The Ross River Dena are an indigenous group located in a remote region of the 
south-east Yukon Territory. As their traditional territory is rich in mineral resources (e.g. 
gold, silver, lead, zinc, platinum, emeralds and possibly diamonds), the history of this 
indigenous group is closely tied to different resource development endeavours. The objective
of the thesis is to investigate whether the IBAs negotiated by the Ross River Dena Council 
(RRDC) for the Faro and KZK mines have been successful in providing short-term and long­
term benefits to indigenous residents. To measure the success of the IBAs, different methods 
are used. First, a general framework is developed through a review of IBA literature. Then 
the success of the IBAs is measured in two different ways: (i) through measuring Ross River 
Dena perception of the benefits received from the IBAs, and (ii) through an analysis of the 
benefits negotiated with the short and long-term benefits received. Finally, to analyse the 
criteria for successful IBAs, they will be compared according to their commonalities and 
differences, and placed within the IBA framework developed earlier. This comparison will 
allow drawing a set of recommendations which then can be used for future resource 
development projects of the RRDC. Further, these recommendations will assist in increasing 
the knowledge about IBAs negotiated by indigenous communities who rely on non­
renewable resources development.
Definitions
The terms used to describe the original inhabitants in North-America, Australia and 
Northern Russia are manifold and extend from Indians, Natives, Aborigines, First Nations, 
and Aboriginal People to Indigenous Peoples. While in Australia, they are mostly referred to 
as Indigenous Peoples and Aboriginal Peoples, in Canada they are called First Nations and 
also Aboriginal Peoples. In the United States they are commonly referred to as Natives. The 
smaller indigenous groups' located on Russian territory are officially called the 'numerically 
small peoples of the north', while when talking about all original groups of the Russian North 
the term 'Indigenous Peoples' is used. The term 'Indigenous Peoples' has also been adopted 
by global organisations such as the World Council of Indigenous Peoples. Thus, this term
These include only groups up to 50,000 people.
will be used throughout the thesis to refer to the original inhabitants of North-America, 
northern Russia and Australia. The term First Nation is used when referring directly to the 
Ross River Dena First Nation.
The term 'industry' refers to large national and multinational corporations. 
Structure of Thesis
The thesis is divided into slx^  chapters. The first chapter gives an overview of the 
ways in which international development theory informs decision-making about mining 
developments in remote regions inhabited by indigenous peoples and concludes by 
introducing current criteria for indigenous development. The second chapter introduces 
IBAs, especially their history, nature and rationale. Chapter 2 will describe emerging IBA 
theories and introduce a newly developed IBA framework, which will be used as a tool to 
analyse the two case studies. The third chapter presents the IBA research project, including 
its design, methods of data gathering, data analysis and limitations. Chapter 4 presents the 
case studies and, as such, introduces the indigenous group negotiating the agreements, its 
history of resource development and the general experience with the negotiation of IBAs. 
The Bfth and sixth chapters provide respectively the analysis, conclusions and 
recommendations for this research project.
Chapter 1 : International Development Theory
1.1. Introduction
Non-renewable resource development projects are of great importance to indigenous 
peoples living in remote areas throughout the world, including the northern regions of 
Canada, United States (Alaska), Australia and Russia. While those nation states are 
categorised as First and Second World countries, these remote regions are referred to as the 
Fourth World. Among other criteria, poor living standards, high rates of un- and 
underemployment, and lack of formal education define these regions as underdeveloped. 
Development theory is a discipline which strives to offer ways to overcome 
underdevelopment through theoretical discourses. As such, development theory has been and 
still is used to inform governments and the public about ways in which resource development 
projects ought to be undertaken to overcome conditions of underdevelopment, and thus 
benefit indigenous people.
This chapter starts by outlining the evolution and meaning of the development 
concept and its influence on indigenous communities located in remote, mineral rich regions. 
Then, the central development theories of modernization and dependency will be examined, 
as they have been used to inform and explain development approaches taken over the past 60 
years. Finally, responding to the failure of traditional development theories, a community- 
driven development approach is presented which aims to increase indigenous participation in 
development activities and thus offers suggestions for how remote communities can achieve 
successful development.
1.2. Concept of Development
We embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our 
scientific advances and industrial progress available for the 
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. The old 
imperialism -  exploitation for foreign profit -  has no place in our 
plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the 
concepts of democratic fair dealing. (Truman, 1949 as quoted in 
Esteva, 1992)
With this speech on January 20 1949, U.S. President Truman laid the foundation for the
dichotomy of developed versus underdeveloped countries, the modem versus the traditional, 
the successful versus the unsuccessful. Currently, two-thirds of the world’s population are 
positioned on the underdeveloped side of the planet (Esteva, 1992). Meanwhile, the term 
development became a fashionable word, encompassing meanings that shifted according to 
the needs of the actors from academia, government, non-governmental organisations and 
industry (Knippers Black, 1999).
For instance, when first introduced in the late 1940s, the goal of development was the 
rapid industrialisation of traditional economies through the provision of start-up capital. 
Development, then, was defined as being the rise of a stagnant Gross National Product 
(GNP) by at least 5 to 7 % a year (Todaro, 2000). Development was measured in economic 
terms; "problems of poverty, unemployment, and income distribution were of secondary 
importance to 'getting the growth job done'" (Todaro, 2CKX), p. 14). However, as 
development efforts based on these premises failed to provide the anticipated economic 
improvements, new approaches to development evolved. Instead of focussing on economic 
issues, development goals broadened to include socio-economic matters, such as income 
distribution, the elimination of poverty, the reduction of environmental degradation, 
sustainability, women rights, cultural integrity (Finnemore, 1997). With the broadening of
development goals, the deAnition of development became more inclusive. One of the most 
commonly used definitions for development is that of Todaro (2000) who states that 
development is a:
process o f improving the quality o f all human lives. Three equally 
important aspects o f developm ent are (1) raising people’s living levels -  
their income and consum ption levels o f food, medical services, education, 
etc., through relevant economic growth processes; (2) creating conditions 
conducive to the growth o f  people’s self-esteem through the establishm ent 
o f social, political and econom ic systems and institutions that promote 
human dignity and respect; and (3) increasing people’s freedom by 
enlarging the range of their choice variables, as by increasing varieties of 
consumer goods and services, (p. 739)
This definition, based on the notion of improving peoples’ quality of life, has been 
accepted by a number of authors and organisations, such as the Conference Board of Canada 
(2001), Elliott (1999), Dragsbaek Schmidt (1998) and others. However, this definition lacks 
important components necessary for improving peoples’ lifestyle. For example, Todaro’s 
definition does not consider the need for the preservation and revival of peoples’ culture and 
the protection of their environment, as well as a consideration for the long-term effects 
(positive and negative) development is imposing on communities and its inhabitants. As 
early as 1978, Chance noted that development in Alaska would not occur if it focused singly 
on the development of natural resources. Instead, development has also to address human 
components, especially in view of indigenous peoples’ culture, in order to be successful. 
More recently. Young (1995) states that because of the environmental and cultural 
degradation experienced by indigenous people in association with development efforts, they 
appreciate acceptable development as "a process which promotes not only economic 
advancement but also their social and cultural vitality and which emphasises long-term 
sustainability rather than short-term gain” (p. 1). It is peoples’ perceptions that count when 
looking at development. Thus, for the purpose of this thesis, development is deGned as a
community-based process which lastingly improves peoples' quality of life from a cultural,
social, political and economic commimity point of view.
1.3. The Fourth World
Questions may arise about using development theory associated with Third World
countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America for conceptualising development of remote
aboriginal communities in First and Second World countries. As for the arctic regions,
Griffiths (1983) expressed and answered these questions as follows:
T h e  in itia l reac tio n  to  th e  h y p o th e s is  m ay b e  on e  o f  d isb e lie f, ‘T h ird  
W o r ld ’ su g g e stin g  tro p ic a l h ea t w av es an d  n ew ly  in d e p e n d e n t or 
n eo -c o lo n ia l sta tus. U p o n  re flec tio n , h o w ev er, it w ill b e  rec o g n ised  
th a t th e  te rm  a lso  co n n o tes  u n d e rd e v e lo p e d  an d  d e v e lo p in g  areas 
w h o se  ev o lu tio n  is su b stan tia lly  a ffec ted  by  th e  d ec is io n s  issu in g  
f ro m  re m o te  m e tro p o lita n  cen tres , an d  w h o se  p o p u la tio n s  ex p e rien c e  
b o th  an  e ro s io n  o f  trad itio n a l cu ltu re  an d  a  sen se  o f  p o w e rle ssn e ss  to  
d e te rm in e  th e ir  ow n  fu tu re  in th e  m id s t o f  e x te rn a lly  g en e ra te d  
change, (p. 350)
Osherenko and Young (1989), and Swiderski (1992) agree with Griffiths’ assessment. Young 
(1995) further expands this statement to the northern regions of Australia by stating that their 
experiences with development have been similar to those of Third World regions. Young 
states "aboriginal peoples form a distinct group within these areas. Their difference in social, 
cultural and economic terms, coupled with the paternalistic nature of the policies which have 
dominated their administration for decades, have led to them being referred to as the ‘Fourth 
World"'(p. 33).
Another concept used to describe Fourth World regions is that of remote regions. 
According to Huskey and Morehouse (1992) remote regions are "physically, economically, 
and politically distant from centres of wealth and power; they are culturally or ethically 
diverse and sparsely settled; and they exhibit extreme limits on their autonomy, self­
sufficiency, and welfare" (p. 128). Northern regions of North America, Russia and Australia 
At within this description. All of these regions, compared to the national average, are marked 
by a high indigenous population, high rate of un- and underemployment, dependence upon 
transfer and welfare payments, and little to no decision-making regarding their development^ 
(see Osherenko & Young, 1989; Young, 1995; Chance & Andreeva, 1995; Espiritu, 1997).
Similar to many Third World countries, the history of remote regions is bound to their 
wealth of renewable and non-renewable resources, which attracted the attention of the 
southern centres (Huskey & Morehouse, 1992). First, the northern regions of Canada and 
Russia, as well as Alaska became known through their wealth of fur bearing animals, while 
indigenous peoples in northern Australia experienced the in-migration of southern grazers to 
take advantage of the “vast plains of splendid pasture” (Young, 1995, p.33). Further, remote 
regions experienced the expansion of modem economies through the ‘discovery’ of non­
renewable resources, such as minerals (e.g. the Klondike Gold rush in the Yukon and the 
Bauxite mine at Western Cape York, North Queensland) and oil and gas (e.g. North Slope 
development in Alaska and the Berezovskoe gas fields in Western Siberia) (see Young, 1995; 
Kauffman, 1998; Espiritu, 1997).
Today, non-renewable resources projects are the most dominant economic sector in 
most of the northern regions of North-America, Russia and Australia. While Aom a corporate 
and governmental perspective many of these developments have been economically 
beneGcial, these developments had mostly disastrous effects on indigenous peoples, for 
example through the destruction of arctic and desert environments, and the associated socio­
economic impacts on the people inhabiting these regions (Young, 1995). Thus, a main focus
 ^Notable exceptions are, for example, some o f A laska’s Boroughs (i.e. N orth Slope Borough) which have 
gained input into decision-m aking concerning their com m unities through the settlement o f land claims as well 
as significant economic developm ent through m ajor resource projects.
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of indigenous development is to find ways to increase economic benefits for northern 
residents, while mitigating the negative outcomes from resource developments. However, 
this is challenging since indigenous communities not only have to defend their claims within 
mainstream society, but also against multinational companies. Anderson and Bone (1995) 
state:
In many ways, the circumstances faced by First N ations struggling to 
achieve econom ic developm ent are sim ilar to those faced by Third W orld 
nations. For both, the objective is to improve the socio-econom ic conditions 
o f  their people. To do this they must find a place in the global capitalist 
economy controlled by others, particularly large corporations. This suggests 
that theories associated with Third W orld developm ent m ight provide useful 
insights into First Nations econom ic development, (p. 123)
Likewise, Huskey and Morehouse (1992) acknowledge the general value of Third World 
development theory in analysing indigenous development in remote regions; yet, they also 
point out that "these are no substitutes for a focus on the "First World" relationships that are 
directly at issue” (p. 129). However, no such theoretical framework for development of 
remote regions in First World states has been built to this point in time. Thus, the remainder 
of this chapter will focus on presenting main classic development theories and their 
application in remote northern regions, and then introduce a new approach to economic 
development based on current practices of indigenous peoples in remote regions of 
developed countries.
1.4. Modernization
Modernization theory arose in the 1950s and 1960s as a response to two factors: Grst, 
the unexpected economic, technological and political growth of European countries after 
World War Two, and second, the United States' fear of underdeveloped countries allying 
themselves with the communist Soviet Union. Modernization theory is argued to be a tool 
that promotes economic and political development, thus leading to stability. The main
11
recipients of modernizing development are traditional societies; the main objective is the 
traditional society's need to overcome 'internal obstacles' such as traditionalism and 
remoteness (Huskey & Morehouse, 1992) to advance to an industrialized level. The core of 
modernization is the belief that traditional societies require outside assistance to start the 
development process, which, once initiated, creates a self-sustaining ripple effect that 
disperses development to society as a whole (Knippers Black, 1999).
Modernization is informed by evolutionary and functional theories. In accordance 
with the evolutionary theory, modernization assumes “social change [that] is unidirectional, 
progressive, and gradual, [and] irreversibly moving societies from a primitive stage to an 
advanced stage, ... making societies more like one another as they proceed along the path of 
evolution” (So, 1990, p. 33). It assumes that once the process of modernization is started, the 
process will progress internally along a linear path without outside influence. Furthermore, 
based on functional belief, modernization theory reflects the assumption of a systematic and 
transformative process as it affects social changes in all social realms of society, and aims to 
transform all traditional structures and values according to modem ideals (based on Western 
standards) (So, 1990). One of the best known approaches to modernization theory is rooted in 
economics: Rostow's Stages of Growth Model, which was prominent from the late 1950s to 
the mid 1960s. According to Rostow's model, development continues along a linear path, 
proceeding from a 'traditional society', to 'preconditions for take-ofT, 'take-off, 'drive to 
maturity' and Anally to the 'age of high mass consumption' or development. Once the critical 
stage, 'take-oA', was reached through Anancial and technological outside assistance, the 
process would inevitably and spontaneously conAnue, and lead to the development and 
modemizaAon of former tradiAonal countnes (EUioA, 1999; Todaro, 2(XX); Fheston, 1996).
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However, in the 1970s it became obvious that despite the worldwide economic 
growth measured in GNP, the anticipated beneAts of development have not been shared 
equally among the nations, but lead to a widening of the gap between the developed and the 
underdeveloped (Elliot, 1994; Brohman, 1996; Todaro, 2000). Consequently, models built on 
modernization theory have become increasingly criticized because of their "misleading 
evolutionary and functionalist assumption, methodological problems, and ideological biases" 
(So, 1990, p. 59). For instance, Rostow’s economic growth model has been recognised as 
suffering from overgeneralization and oversimplification as it insists on development 
proceeding along a linear path (Fry & Martin, 1991), and omits differences within 
underdeveloped regions with reference to history, location and culture (So, 1990; Swiderski, 
1992). Being based exclusively on the interpretation of internal factors for development, 
modernization failed to consider the devastating effects external factors can have on 
developing regions (Todaro, 2000). Further, disregarding the importance of regionalism, the 
modernization ideal is based on the assumption that the state will lead the development 
process without active input from the recipients of development (top-down process) (So, 
1990). Finally, as modernization relies strictly on economic factors, such as capital, 
technology and management, it misses the importance of social factors for development, such 
as training and education for the underdeveloped population.
Past development experiences in remote regions, which often are dominated by large- 
scale mining developments, underline the accuracy of these critiques. Focussing on the 
provision of start-up capital and substitution of infrastructure, federal governments have been 
instrumental in facilitating mining projects in remote regions to gain national economic 
benefits while aiming to bring long-term development to indigenous peoples. Assimilation of
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indigenous people into the mainstream society was the cornerstone of this ^proach (Young, 
1995; Elias, 1991; Fiideres & Gadacz, 2(X)1), as the 'modernization' of the people was equal 
to their increased benefit to the national economy and their improved living conditions. 
However, the benefits (mostly employment opportunities) received by indigenous people 
through large-scale projects were short-term and limited (Stabler & Howe, 1990; Young 
1995). Instead of modernizing remote regions, these mining developments had substantial 
detrimental effects on the indigenous population of the regions through the degradation of the 
land, and the disruption of the social, economic and cultural structure of the communities 
(Whittington, 1986; Couchiching Study Group, 1978; Espiritu, 1997).
An example of the modernization approach taken by government is the Pine Point 
Mine (Northwest Territories, Canada), which was built near the indigenous community of 
Fort Resolution. Promoted by government with substantial subsidies such as infrastructure 
and tax holidays, this mine opened in 1964. At this point in time, neither government nor 
industry paid attention to the environmental and social impacts of the mine on the indigenous 
population. No arrangements were made to facilitate the incorporation of indigenous people 
into the workforce of the mine. Moreover the infrastructure built bypassed the community, 
and thus enforced the already depressed local economy of Fort Resolution (MacPherson, 
1978b). MacPherson (1978b) observed:
The native people had only limited access to employment in the attractive
sector, although they bore the brunt o f the negative effects from  the 
development. All investments during the initial stages o f developm ent were 
made solely with the objective o f bringing the mine into production; no 
significant expenditures were made to maximize the possible regional 
benefits o f the project, or to minimize its adverse impacts, (p. 102)
As a result, the community of Fort Resolution suffered social disruption and a severe decline 
of the traditional and modem economic sector, and consequently became increasingly 
dependent upon federal welfare payments.
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This development initiative demonstrated that a simple infiltration of money, 
technology and institutional structures from western centres was not able to start up a 
development process which led automatically to 'modernization', bringing prosperity and 
well-being to remote indigenous communities. Instead of promoting self-sustainable and
economically independent communities, state intervention in indigenous soeieties such as 
welfare payments, and the degradation of the land base through large-scale non-renewable 
resource projects created a dependent relationship between government and/or industry and 
northern communities. This dependency will be further explored in the following section.
1.5. Dependency
Dependency theory emerged in the early 1960s as a response to the deteriorating 
effects of the Ameriean modernization school. While modernization presents a view of the 
First World on development, the dependency school represents the Third World’s view of the 
results of development activities. In contrast to modernization theory, which takes an 
ahistorical approaeh to development analysis and focuses on the internal structures necessary 
for development, dependency theory is built upon a historical investigation of external forces 
that constructed economic, political and cultural dependencies between core and periphery 
(Preston, 1996; Valenzuela & Valenzuela, 1998; Frank, 1967). Cores are economic centres 
which become powerful by weakening the surrounding peripheries, also referred to as 
underdeveloped areas. While the peripheries rely on inexpensively supplying primary 
resources and low-tech products, the centre delivers highly priced high-tech goods. 
Dependency theory maintains that this unequal economic exchange is the root of the 
development conflict (Fry & Martin, 1991). It furthermore claims that the reason for the 
underdevelopment of certain countries and regions is the direct result of global economic and
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political structures, which are determined by Western states (Valenzuela & Valenzuela,
1998; Anderson and Bone, 1995). Thus, the problem of underdevelopment cannot be solved 
unless international economic structures are tamed through national trade barriers, the control 
of multi-national corporations, and the formation of regional trade structures which are
enforced through a strong state government (Preston, 1996). However, as national 
governments traditionally have strong ties to core countries which are not easily untied, 
"many dependency researchers propose that socialist revolution may be necessary . . . to  get
rid of old ruling elites” (So, 1990, p. 106).
One of the most renowned dependency theorists, Andre Gunder Frank, suggested the 
above-described structural relationship of metropolis (core) and satellite (periphery) based on 
his work in Latin America, (see Frank, 1967). In a study published in 1969, Frank used a 
dependency model to describe regional relationships enforcing underdevelopment within 
developed nation states, in particular Brazil. Frétés (1988) used Frank’s work to test the 
usefulness of dependency theory in explaining underdevelopment patterns in the Canadian 
Arctic. Drawing on historic events in the Canadian Arctic, such as the fur trade, the whaling 
industry, the Klondike Goldrush and the petroleum boom in the seventies. Frétés compares 
the economic development patterns of Brazil's and Canada's northern regions. He states that 
the model presented by Frank applies equally to both areas and hence, concludes that 
"[Frank's] model seems to help explain the nature of underdevelopment in the Canadian 
North” (p. 115).
However, dependency theory is challenged by a number of authors based mainly on 
two arguments. First, critiques state that the exclusive reliance on external influences gives 
the impression of the periphery being passive and without any influence in decision making
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(So, 1990). Second, a number of critiques question the ability of dependency theory to 
provide solutions (Young, 1995; Fry & Martin 1991; Forbes, 1984). For example, given the 
small population in the remote northern regions of Canada, Russia and Alaska, and its 
general dependence on outside assistance (Gnancial as well as human resources) it is 
questionable if a separation from the south through a socialistic revolution would assist 
indigenous people in overcoming underdevelopment. Hence, Fry & Martin (1991) conclude 
that dependency theory is "more useful as a method of critique and explanation than a set of 
specific solutions. However, it has served to facilitate a deeper and more complete 
understanding of the international political and economic system” (p. 98).
1.6. Indigenous Development
Assimilation attempts initiated by federal governments through modernization 
approaches, for example in Canada, Australia, the United States and Russia, have not been 
successful in abolishing indigenous peoples’ culture. However, politics, education and media 
have greatly influenced peoples’ perceptions of desired lifestyles, including possession of 
amenities created in core centres (e.g. trucks, guns, ammunition and Nike apparel). This has 
created a demand for wage employment which, in most remote regions, can only be filled by 
government or mining related businesses (Whittington, 1986; Young, 1995). Hence, 
economic development has become a central focal point of indigenous communities 
(Newhouse, 1997; Elias, 1995). However, past development approaches proved to be 
inappropriate to indigenous people as they first, marginalized indigenous people as have- 
nots, second, disregarded the traditional economy as an important economic sector for 
indigenous communities, and third, were based on top-down approaches without regard for 
the communities’ views of their future or opportunities to share the development’s beneGts.
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Thus, there arose a need to identify factors that promote long-term development of remote 
indigenous communities while being "appropriate to their lifestyle and aspirations" (Young, 
1995, p. 3).
Over the past two to three decades a vast body of literature, mainly produced by 
development practitioners (such as indigenous and government officials working in the area 
of indigenous development) has evolved, which promotes the idea of a bottom-up process to
development^. A bottom-up process gives communities the opportunity to create 
development which is dynamic and sensitive in responding to communities’ particular needs 
and desires. Due to the bureaucratic limitations, development agendas promoted by 
government tend to divide activities according to the perceived problem areas (economic, 
education, social, housing) (Dodson, 1985). In contrast, using a bottom-up process enables 
planning from a holistic point of view, including economic, social, cultural, political and 
environmental aspects of community life while considering communities’ knowledge from 
past experiences and their future goals (Frideres & Gadacz, 2001). As such, this approach is 
argued to stand in opposition to development characteristics promoted by modernization 
theory and criticized by dependency theory (e.g. Young, 1995).
However, Anderson and Bone (1995) argue that the new approach stands not in 
opposition to modernization or dependency, but rather is a contingency of the economic 
regime in place. Anderson and Bone maintain that the bottom-up process is not as much a 
change from the 'regime of accumulation’ (dominance of transnational corporations acting 
on a global level), but rather a change of the 'social mode of regulation’ (established 
structures of doing business located on all levels, from the local to the global). This, in turn,
 ^The bottom-up process is also referred to as grass-roots development, alternative development, community 
empowerment, or in the context o f developm ent o f indigenous com munities, aboriginal development.
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causes a change in the 'mode of development' (the approach taken to react to the regime of 
accumulation and the social mode of regulation). As such indigenous development is not a 
new development theory, but is a contingent response to the ongoing regime of 
accumulation; hence he calls it contingency perspective. Anderson and Bone (1995) state:
A ccording to this perspective, communities, regions, and nations are all part 
o f the global economy and must accom m odate them selves to the 
requirem ents o f  the current dom inant regim e o f accumulation. The approach 
adopted toward that economy (mode o f development) can reflect 
local/regional/national characteristics and can m eet local/regional /national 
needs. W hether it does so or not depends in large part on the presence of an 
active civil sector capable o f articulating those needs and a leadership 
capable o f developing strategies and structures and negotiating 
arrangem ents necessary to address those needs, (p. 126)
Indigenous development fits well within the contingency perspective as it explains why
indigenous communities are not ignoring large-scale economic development such as mining
projects, but seek partnerships with companies to share the economic benefits. The improved
bargaining position taken by indigenous people has a number of reasons, such as the
increased recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights by national and international
organisations and government"^ and the need for established transnational corporations to
display corporate responsibility to maintain stability on the market (Goodman, 2003). The
contingency perspective is positive about the potential success of the emerging indigenous
approach to development (Anderson, 1995). Based on the premise of active participation, the
contingency perspective outlines the necessity of 'various forms of partnerships and alliance"
with other indigenous and non-indigenous businesses.
Being stiU in its infant state, there is no universally agreed-upon set of principles for 
indigenous development available in literature. This, arguably, is consistent with their 
purpose: being flexible to communities' needs and aspirations. For example, the development
* Largely due to indigenous peoples’ pressure at international forums, such as the UN, as well as national 
forums to recognize the right o f self-determination o f indigenous peoples (Venne, 1998).
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principles proposed by the Fowr /ntemahonaZ /fwntwtg (see Appendix 1.1.) are based
on traditional values such as holistic learning, the use of elders' knowledge and the 
interdependency of spirituality and materialism (Croal & Darou, 2002). Meanwhile 
development principles agreed by participants of a conference on indigenous resources
development^ are rather pragmatic as they focus on the requirements of planning processes, 
technical assistance and cooperation with governments (see Appendix 1.2.). Focussing on
specifically economic development, Anderson and Bone (1995), state that indigenous 
development is:
a collective approach ... that is closely tied to each First N ations’ traditional 
lands and practices and its identity as a Nation. This developm ent approach 
serves three purposes:
1. The attainment of economic self-sufficiency as a necessary condition 
for the realization o f self-governm ent at the Nation level.
2. The improvement o f the socio-econom ic circumstances o f the people of 
the First Nations.
3. The preservation and strengthening of traditional culture, values and 
languages and the reflection o f the same in  developm ent activities, (pp.
122- 123)
Further, Anderson and Bone (1995) add that the key to achieving these objectives lies in the 
realization of indigenous business ownership which is profitable in the long-term and which 
is open to form alliances and joint-ventures with other indigenous and non-indigenous 
partners. Despite the lack of agreement on a particular set of development objectives, some 
universal ideas about indigenous development are recognisable. First, economic development 
is seen as the main instrument for community development. Second, economic community 
development is not the end, but the means to create the conditions for an holistic approach to 
development, including social, cultural, spiritual and environmental goals and aspirations. 
Third, economic development must be controlled by the communities to ensure that they are 
appropriate to the needs and aspiration of a particular indigenous community or group.
 ^ International Conference, ‘Towards Native Self-Reliance Renewal and D evelopm ent’ held in Vancouver, 
August 19-24, 1984).
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Fourth, indigenous communities need to establish partnerships with government and industry 
to pursue their community development objectives.
Six elements o f such co-operation are:
-  indigenous peoples .. .decide w hat is important, and why;
-  all parties identify objectives o f their work;
-  developers and indigenous peoples work together to respect each
other's needs;
-  indigenous peoples have a key role in project monitoring and follow- 
up;
-  planning allows scope to use indigenous knowledge in envisioning the 
project results and benefits;
-  indigenous peoples are enabled to use their traditional knowledge, not 
ju st talk about it. (Croal & Darou, 2000, pp. 15-16)
The realisation of indigenous development is challenging as it must respond to a 
variety of limitations. How, for example, can traditional values, environmental health and 
modern economic necessities being merged with western ideals of development in a 
meaningful way? Given the social, economic and educational limitations faced by many 
remote indigenous communities, how can indigenous people prepare for economic 
opportunities? Considering that most mining developments are undertaken by multinational 
corporations, how can small indigenous groups be enabled to take an efficient position in 
negotiating development outcomes desired for their communities? The key issue recognized 
in literature is the necessity for long-term capacity-building in indigenous communities 
through the allocation of appropriate funding and conditions by government and industry, 
and the creation of an understanding and appreciation of traditional culture, economy and 
knowledge by community outsiders, such as government, industry and the general public.
21
Chapter 2: Impact and BeneGts Agreements
2.1. Introduction
The previous chapter presented development theories and their impacts on 
underdeveloped remote regions inhabited by indigenous people. It recognised development
as being a community-based process which lastingly improves peoples’ quality of life from a 
cultural, social, political and economic community point of view. Further, Chapter 1 pointed 
to the importance indigenous people place on economic development to achieve community 
development. Part of economic development is the building of partnerships to take full 
advantage of economic opportunities. This chapter will introduce one tool used to achieve 
economic development through partnerships with mineral resources companies: Impact and 
Benefits Agreements (IB As). These agreements are used to mitigate negative development 
impacts while enhancing positive mining outcomes for indigenous communities. Depending 
upon the location, purpose and time of development IB As are also referred to as socio­
economic agreements^, participation agreements^, economic agreements,* Inuit Impact and 
Benefits Agreements (IIBAs)^, mining agreements and others.
This chapter will give a brief overview of the history, structure and use of IBAs in 
Alaska and northern regions of Australia, Canada and Russia. Further, using literature on 
IBA theory and experiences, this chapter presents an IBA framework which will be used to 
analyse factors for their success. As IBAs can vary tremendously in terms of their regulatory 
context, the parties involved, and the impacts caused by the development, this thesis wiU 
focus on discussing a particular set of IBAs: those that have been negotiated directly between
 ^Commonly used for agreem ents negotiated between governm ent and industry in Canada. 
 ^This term refers to specific IBA s under the Inuvialuit Final Land Claim  Act (Canada).
® Commonly used for agreements negotiated in Russia.
’ Used for agreements negotiated under the N unavut Land C laim  A ct (Canada).
Term used in Australian literature referring to IBAs (see Kauffm an, 1998).
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indigenous peoples and industry for large-scale hard mineral projects in remote regions of 
Alaska and Northern Australia, Canada and Russia.
2.2. History
Today’s IBAs are a result of evolution. It is difficult to determine when the first IBA 
was signed. In Canada and Australia, early IBAs were signed between government and 
industry to negotiate employment opportunities (in Canada) and royalty payments (in 
Australia) for indigenous people. For example, the Anvil Agreement^ ^  signed in 1967 
between the federal government and industry confirmed subsidy payments by government 
for the development of the Faro Mine. In return, industry agreed to set employment quotas 
for Yukon First Nations. The first IBA in Australia was signed between the Commonwealth 
of Australia and the Groote Eylandt Mining Corporation (a subsidiary of BHP) for a 
manganese mine on Groote Eylandt, Arnhem Land. This agreement confirmed royalty 
payments to trust funds for the benefit of indigenous peoples affected by mining (Kauffman, 
1998). Since the negotiation of these agreements, the negotiating parties of these agreements 
have changed. In Australia, agreements negotiated in the 1970 were signed between 
government and indigenous councils, and since the 1980s directly between industry and the 
affected indigenous groups (Kauffman, 1998). In Canada, most of the IBAs negotiated since 
the 1990s have been negotiated directly between industry and indigenous communities with 
little or no direct interference by governments. Also, the content of IBAs became more 
complex over time. While early IBAs in Canada focussed almost exclusively on training, 
employment and business opportunities and in Australia on royalty payments, more recent 
IBAs include a wide variety of benefits, including support for social and cultural programs, 
royalty and equity payments, educational and scholarship programs, and measures for the
Agreement between H er M ajesty the Queen ... and Anvil M ining Com pany Lim ited ... 21 August 1967.
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protection of environmental and culturally significant areas (Kauffman, 1998; Kennett, 
1999a).
The history of IBAs in Alaska and Russia differs from those of Canada and Australia 
due to the differing systems of land ownership and perception of indigenous peoples' rights. 
For instance, there is virtually no information available regarding the history and present use 
of IBAs in Alaska, as they are perceived as being private agreements between industry and 
the Native corporations (R. Caulfield, personal communication, August, 2003). Further, there 
are no indications that the government has negotiated any agreements with industry for the 
benefit of Alaska’s indigenous population; the settlement of land claim sbefore opening the 
first major non-renewable resources enterprise'^ seemed to have eliminated the obligation for 
government to negotiate in the interest of the indigenous peoples. Also, little is known as to 
whether or how the content of IBAs has changed over time. However, recent agreements 
(such as the IBA between the NANA Corporation and Cominco) tend to be similar in content 
to these of Canada and Australia'"'.
As for Russia, there are no accounts about IBAs negotiated before the 1990s. In fact, 
the first documented IBA in English written literature is an economic agreement negotiated 
in 1991 in the Khanty-Mansijsk Autonomous Okrug (KMAO). This agreement was signed 
between the Khanty of the lower Trom-Agan and Yuganskneftegaz (gas company). The 
beneEts negotiated include consultation, compensation, environmental protection measures, 
the provision of working clothes, payments for higher education, summer vacations and
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) was signed in 1971 (Caulfield, 2003).
Prudhoe Bay was discovered in 1968 and the associated Trans-Alaska oil pipeline was built from  1974-77 
(Caulfield, 2003).
The benefits included the IBA between NANA and Com inco “provides for royalty paym ents and profit 
sharing, the establishm ent o f jo in t management and advisory com mittees, the developm ent o f tribal member 
training and em ploym ent programs, and for the protection o f the environm ent” (M cLean & Hensley, 1994).
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medical care, assistance for building of a kindergarten and a clinic, and the sale and exchange 
of local food products to the company in return for money and equipment (Wiget, 2000). The 
information provided by Wiget (2000) suggests that the content of IBAs in Russia varies 
greatly depending upon the negotiating power of the indigenous group. However, Veselov 
(2003) states that there is a general trend in the KMAO to improve the agreements by 
learning from each other's successes and mistakes. Besides the IBAs negotiated in the 
KMAO, there are no indications of IBAs in other regions of Russia (Veselov, 2003).
2.3. Definition
IBAs are arrangements that establish a formal relationship between the parties 
involved in renewable as well as non-renewable resource development projects. IBAs are 
complex and generally unique to any pro jectC urrently , most IBAs are signed between two 
parties: the indigenous community affected by a particular project, and the company 
developing the project. Exceptions are IBAs signed between government and industry*^, and 
IBAs signed by indigenous people, industry and govemment(s)'^. IBAs serve different 
purposes. Indigenous people and government use IBAs “to address the concerns of 
indigenous people and other local residents regarding the adverse effects that large-scale 
mineral development may have on their communities, culture, way of life, natural 
environment and land-based economic activities" (Kennett, 1999a, p. 1), and to secure local 
short-term and long-term benefits from those developments (Keimett, 1999a, pp. 1-2). 
Industry increasingly accepts IBAs “as one element of the complex set of regulatory.
Although, increasingly standard IBAs are produced by different indigenous groups and organisations to ease 
the negotiating process and create transparency for com m unity members and industry.
For example the Alyeska Pipeline's Federal R ight o f  W ay agreem ent (Alaska) and Ekati M ine Socio­
economic Agreem ent (Canada), Both Agreements have been negotiated for the benefit o f all state/territory 
residents.
The Sa Dena Hes Agreem ent was negotiated in 1991 between Cominco, the Liard First Nation, the Kaska 
Nation, and the territorial and municipal governments.
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community relations, technical, and economic considerations that must be addressed if a 
m ^or mining project is to progress smoothly from the initial planning stages to final 
approval and operational status" (Kennett, 1999a, p. 1-2).
To this point in time, no universally agreed-upon definition of IBAs has been 
developed. The definitions offered are limited and even contradictory in current IBA 
literature. For instance, O'Reilly and Eacott (1998) state "Impact and benefit agreements are 
intended to ensure that Indigenous peoples benefit from mining projects and are compensated 
for the negative impacts of mines on their communities, their land, and their traditional way 
of life” (p. 1). However, IBAs are not only intended to compensate indigenous peoples, but 
to foster northern development through offering economic opportunities to local people. 
O’Faircheallaigh (1995) describes IBAs as:
M ineral developm ent agreements are defined here as contractual 
arrangements entered into by Aboriginal organizations or com munities 
under which they agree to support, or not to oppose, exploration or mining 
activity on land they own or claim , and in return are offered defined benefits 
which would not accrue to them as a result of standard com mercial 
transactions or o f general governm ent policy (p. 19).
As with the definition by O’Reilly and Eacott, O’Faircheallaigh’s definition is based on the 
premise of compensation. Further, this definition states that IBAs are used to secure project 
support from indigenous peoples. Yet, Sosa and Keenan (2001) state "the inclusion of such 
clauses should be avoided, particularly where IBAs are negotiated at an early stage of a 
project when information about its predicted impacts may be insufGcient or uncertain" (p.
10). Moreover, Article 29 of the Nwnavwt Law/ Agrgemgnt clearly prohibits clauses
that inhibit indigenous peoples' rights to participate "freely in regulatory proceedings in 
relation to proposed projects" (Kennett, 1999a, p. 46). Hence, O'FaircheaUaigh's deEnition is 
not sufficient in deEning IBAs as used throughout remote regions. In the absence of other 
deEnitions, IBAs, for the purpose of this thesis, are defined as arrangements negotiated
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between indigenous communities (or other governments) and industries, which aim to 
mitigate adverse development impacts on indigenous communities and their traditional ways 
of life, their culture and their environment, while providing local short and long-term benefits 
to the affected indigenous communities, and thus stimulating their economic development.
Local benefits are usually considered to include "employment, training and business 
opportunities that flow to the community as a result of a mineral development project" 
(Keeping, 1999, p. 3). These refer to subjects that indigenous communities identify as being 
useful to overcome negative development impacts, and create long-term cultural, political, 
and economic security and stability. This list of local benefits provided by Keeping can be 
expanded, as demonstrated by Kennett (1999a), who built a comprehensive list of local 
benefits that have been negotiated in Canadian IBAs. The list comprises more than fifty 
items, which are categorised under the following main sections: employment and training, 
economic development and business opportunities, social, cultural and community support, 
financial provisions and equity participation, and protection of the environment and cultural 
resources (see Appendix 2.1.).
The legal nature of IBAs is unclear because of their hybrid character between contract 
and regulatory tool. Framed as contracts, IBAs often serve regulatory functions, such as 
specifying under which conditions a project can go ahead. Furthermore, their vague language 
as well as their primary intent of building good neighbouring relations inhibits the 
enforceability of the agreements (Kennett, 1999a). As there is no information about judicial 
interpretations of these agreements, Kennett (1999a) cautions us to perceive IBAs simply as 
"analogous to legal binding private contracts" (p. 27).
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2.4. Rationale
IBAs emerged slowly over the past 50 years, responding to the severe socio­
economic, cultural and environmental impacts caused by mining developments in the vicinity 
of indigenous settlements and the increased recognition of indigenous peoples' rights around 
the globe. These two factors provide the rationale for IBAs and are further explored in the
following section.
2.4.1. Socio-economic, Cultural and Environmental Context
As discussed in Chapter 1, the northern regions of Australia, Canada, Russia and the 
United States (Alaska) which are rich in non-renewable resources, have been used 
extensively by national interests to provide resources and income to southern centres. The 
indigenous peoples living in the North were left with the negative impacts of these 
developments on their land and their communities. These impacts have been documented in a 
variety of empirical studies, many of which were summarised by O’Faircheallaigh (1991) in 
an attempt to build a universal framework explaining resource development impacts on 
indigenous communities throughout the world. The studies reviewed for this article include, 
among others, examples of mining developments in Australia, Canada, Greenland, Indonesia, 
Libya, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russia and the United States. O’Faircheallaigh 
argues that despite differences of indigenous people’s economic, social and cultural 
backgroimd, indigenous people experience similar impacts from large-scale mineral 
developments'^. To ease the categorisation of development experiences O’Faircheallaigh 
proposes three groups of positive and negative development impacts: economic, social and
' O ’Faircheallaigh uses the term  mineral developm ent for hard mineral projects, as well as oil and gas projects.
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cultural, and environmental. According to these, negative resource development impacts 
experienced by indigenous groups include, but are not limited to:
• the loss of land, and thus the base of their traditional economic and cultural activities;
• the in-migration of an outside labour force, causing, for example, loss of self-esteem,
alcohol and drug abuse, and family violence; and
• environmental degradation of the land, animals, plants and people.
Positive development impacts possible through resource developments include:
• monetary income through wage employment, which in some cases has led to the 
strengthening and revival of traditional activities;
• royalty and equity payments to indigenous groups;
• training and other education programs; and
• increasing political presence of indigenous peoples.
O’Faircheallaigh clearly demonstrates that while positive development outcomes are 
possible, most of the experiences of indigenous peoples in the past were overwhelmingly 
negative.
Considering the demographic profile of these remote regions, which generally 
features a high percentage of indigenous people, a demographic pyramid favouring young 
people, and extremely high levels of unemployment (see Sub-committee of the 
Intergovernmental Working Group on Mineral Industry [SIWG], 1996; Frideres, 1998; 
Young, 1995; Agitaev, 2002), indigenous communities have the potential of benefiting from 
mineral developments through employment, training and education programs, and other 
proceeds, such as royalties and equity payments. However, taking advantage of positive 
development effects requires the mitigation of potential negative impacts while encouraging
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positive development outcomes. These tasks are accomplished through the negotiation of 
IBAs. Yet, the negotiation of these agreements does not happen in a vacuum, but is guided 
directly or indirectly by regulations and policies which establish formal relationships 
between the parties involved in resource developments: industry; the indigenous group 
and/or community; and governments.
2.4.2. Legal and Policy Context
The judicial*^ and legal^° recognition of indigenous peoples’ title to unsurrendered 
lands has been instrumental in demonstrating to government the right of indigenous peoples 
to negotiate agreements concerning resource development projects affecting their lands. Yet, 
the differences in indigenous peoples’ title to land have implications on their statutory right 
to negotiate IBAs. While some indigenous groups have settled their land claims, others are 
still in the process of obtaining these. Further, while some countries (or regions within 
countries) have policies and regulations directly addressing the need to negotiate IBAs with 
indigenous communities, others only indirectly promote the negotiation of agreements. 
Finally, even in the absence of land claims and regulations, indigenous peoples seem to gain 
greater influence in conveying their interest, partly because of companies' requirements to 
portray corporate responsibility and partly because of the opportunity for cost reduction.
In Alaska, land claims were settled in 1971 with the AW&n Aahve LanJ
Act which extinguished indigenous rights in exchange for a monetary payment 
and private land title to 14% of Alaska's land area. Thirteen Native regional corporations 
were created as economic engines for some 200 village corporations. As private land owners, 
Alaskan indigenous people have the right to negotiate any agreement with industry wishing
See Mabo (1992) and Wik (1996) (Australia), and Delgamuukw (1997) (Canada).
^  The Native Land Claim  A ct from 1971 (United States, Alaska)
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to pursue mineral developments on their lands (R. Caulfield, personal communication,
August 2003). As these agreements are private and usually subject to confidentiality, little 
information is available about their content and success^'. Despite the lack of information, 
these agreements play an important role in the development efforts of Alaskan Native 
corporations (B. Charles, Vice President of the Calista Corporation, personal communication, 
August 2002).
In Australia, the legal and regulatory background of IBAs varies according to the 
ownership of the land, the regulatory framework of the region and the interpretation of 
judicial decisions in the 1990s. Until 1992 indigenous rights were not confirmed by the 
Australian government, and thus only through explicit legislation could IBA negotiations 
occur. For instance, the 1976 Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act opened an 
avenue for indigenous land councils to negotiate with government royalty payments for 
indigenous groups affected by development. Similarly, Queensland’s Mineral Resources Act 
from 1989 enabled the indigenous council of the region (Cape York Council) to enter IBA 
negotiations which provided substantial benefits to their indigenous communities 
(O’Faircheallaigh, 2000a). Today, most of Australia is covered by indigenous land councils 
representing the interest of the indigenous groups in their region^ (Kauffman, 1998); 
however, the success of these land councils in providing benefits to their communities varies 
greatly (O 'Faircheallaigh, 2(XX)a).
In 1992, the Mabo decision by "Australia's High Court overturned earlier judicial 
rulings by determining that indigenous ownership of land, in the form of native title, survived
One exception is the agreement(s) negotiated between the N A NA  corporation and Com inco for the Red Dog 
M ine which has been published extensively.
“  However, the presence of an aboriginal land council does not automatically translate into the negotiation of 
successful IBAs.
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the imposition of British rule in 1788" (O'Faircheallaigh, 2000a, Ï  3). This decision caused 
two reactions: first, indigenous people increasingly requested the recognition of their 
traditional lands; and second, the federal government introduced the 1993 Nahwe Tit/e Act 
"which provided for the exercise of a right to negotiate by native title holders in relation to 
certain future acts, including granting of mining leases” (O’Faircheallaigh, 2000a, |  3). A 
court decision in 1996 (Wik) further strengthened the rights of indigenous people to their 
traditional lands; however, the Native Title Amendment Act of 1998 decreased the 
effectiveness of the Mabo and Wik decisions as it:
substantially toughened the registration test for native title claim ants and 
rem oved or diminished indigenous procedural rights in relation to areas 
such as renewal o f mining leases, developm ent o f private mining 
infrastructure, and mineral exploration. The new act also conferred on state 
governments, traditionally enthusiastic supporters o f large-scale resource 
development, the capacity to develop alternative regimes to the right-to- 
negotiate provisions o f the Native Title Act 1993 (O ’Faircheallaigh, 2000a,
Ï4).
Since then, IBAs have still been negotiated and continued to provide (at least some) 
indigenous groups with substantial benefits; however the Native Title Amendment Act has 
toughened the IBA negotiating climate in Australia (O ' Faircheallaigh, 2000a).
With the settlement of indigenous land claims in the Canadian North, the legal 
structure for the negotiation of IBAs changed. Compared to the Alaska land claim settlement, 
in Canada all land claims are unique, and offer different sets of statutes and regulations. It is 
outside the scope of this paper to review these in detail^however important differences wdl 
be highlighted. Land claim agreements have resulted in the designation of variations of land 
rights: surface rights, surface rights and subsurface rights, and, in one case, only subsurface 
rights. These variations of land rights trigger different constellations for the negotiation of
^  For a detailed discussion on legal and policy requirem ents see Keeping (1999) and Henderson (2001).
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IBAs. First, if the indigenous group owns both surface and subsurface rights, it is up to their 
discretion to negotiate IBAs (sitnilar to the Alaskan model) (Henderson & Voogd, 2001; 
Kennett, 1999a). In the instance of mineral development occurring on lands where 
indigenous people only obtained surface rights, IBA negotiations can, according to the
respective land claim agreement, be part of the regulatory requirements to access land. For 
example, the Inuvialuit Final Agreement states that a participation agreement must be signed
when industry accesses Inuvialuit lands to carry out resource development. The Sahtu and 
Gwich’in Final Agreements are less specific in terms of requiring the negotiation of IBAs for 
access to crown-owned resources (Kennett, 1999a). The most specific and comprehensive 
sections regarding provisions for the negotiation of IBAs are included in the Nunavut Land 
Claims Agreement; Article 26 outlines “clear substantive and procedural obligations 
regarding the negotiation of HE As for major development projects” (Kennett, 1999a, p. 20) 
including a section listing matters that are appropriate to consider when negotiating an DBA 
(see Appendix 2.2.). Although Article 26 has become an example of a statutory regime in 
Canada, its actual effectiveness in providing benefits to local communities is still uncertain 
(Kennett, 1999a).
For indigenous groups without a land claim, the legal requirements for negotiating 
IBAs for hard mineral developments are less determined as the federal and territorial statutes 
regulating hard mineral developments on Crown lands do not require the negotiation of IBAs 
(Henderson & Voogd, 2001; Keeping, 1999)"^. On the contrary, based on the free entry 
system, the statutes encourage individuals and companies to freely enter Crown land, claim
An exception is N unavut where, by statute, IIBAs are a requirem ent for obtaining permissions for large-scale 
resource developm ent projects.
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minerals and proceed with mining activities'^ (Barton, 1997; Henderson, 2001; Henderson & 
Voogd, 2(X)1). However, the lack of statutes and regulations has not hindered the negotiation 
of IBAs. The negotiation of IBAs has been encouraged, for example, through ad-hoc 
approaches taken by government and courts, and through the recognition of the need for
shared benefits for the partners included in a development project. For instance, in the case of 
the Ekati Mine (NWT), the federal government made the approval of a water hcense 
application by the developer Broken Hill Proprietary Limited (BHP) dependent upon the 
substantial progress in the negotiation of IBAs with four affected communities during a 60- 
day period. Although appreciated as an important step towards a federal requirement of IBAs 
for large-scale mineral development projects, Keeping (1999, pp. 14-19) cautions that the 
approach taken by the federal government probably would not be sustained in court, which 
has implications on the enforceability of the IBAs negotiated (Keeping, 1999). Further, the 
requirement to gain substantive progress within a 60-day period had negative implications on 
the negotiation process; first, because of intensive time pressure, and second, because of 
uncertainties about the definition of ‘substantive progress’ and the repercussions if such 
progress could not be reached within time (Bielawski, 2003)^^.
The Faro Mine IBA, signed in 1994 between the Ross River Dena Council (RRDC) 
and Anvil Range Mining Corporation, appears to be influenced by an order of the Ontario 
Court of Justice, which states:
THIS COURT ORDERS that the Interim  Receiver is to request any 
proposed purchaser o f the Faro mine to negotiate in good faith and 
reasonably a social and econom ic benefits agreement reasonably 
satisfactory to the Ross River D ena Council and to report on such to the
U nder the free entry system, the state can only withdraw lands from  staking; otherwise, if  claimants follow all 
regulatory procedures, a claim ant can decide “where mineral exploration occurs, where claims are located, or 
where producing mines may be developed“(Barton, 1997, p. 89).
^  A detailed discussion o f the IBAs negotiated for the Ekati M ine can be reviewed in Keeping (1999), Chapter 
8 and 10.
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Court upon any motion for approval o f  sale. (R. v. Curragh Inc.; May 7,
1994, point 4)
Achieving the negotiation of IBAs directly through court cases has not yet been documented 
in literature, and thus seems to be a new phenomenon. Finally, the current move by the 
federal, provincial and territorial governments to consulting indigenous communities 
regarding the issuance of water licenses for projects on their traditional territory has placed 
responsibility upon industry to create good relations with indigenous groups. This need for 
creating good relations (Kennett, 1999b) as well as the increasing pressure of transnational 
companies to demonstrate corporate responsibility (Goodman, 2003) seem to have led to a 
increase in the negotiation of IBAs in Canada.
To this time, no indigenous land claims have been settled in Russia. Still, there have 
been important movements in the recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights to land and their 
traditional activities since the opening to the western market. Fostered by the severe 
ecological damage by northern resource developments on the land, at least one regional 
government (the Council of People’s Deputies of the KMAO) took action by issuing in 
February 1992 Regulations concerning the status o f kinship communities in KMAO^^, and a 
decree CoMcgmmg lAg AppZymg lAg jRegwluhoM coMcgmmg fAg o/"
ki/wAip in aiming to regulate industrial development on traditional
indigenous territory^^. About the same time, federal law set out that local self-governments 
can exist within the federal state, and thus "set in motion a legal process of formally dehning 
the boundaries of family hunting territories" (Wiget & Balalaeva, 1997, % 16). According to 
article 21 of the above mentioned regulations "acquiring ... [a] parcel of land on the territory
^  Polozhenie o statuse rodovyx ugodii v Xanty-Mansiiskom avtonomnom okryge
^ O mgjwiûmf vngdneniyo Po/ozAeniya o jfafuje rodoyyz w avfono/wiom ot/yge
29 In the case of the KM AO, these are mostly oil and gas developments.
35
of kinship lands [for industrial purposes] can be carried ou t... only with the consent of the 
owner of the kinship land, and also native residents whose interests are involved in this 
taking" (Wiget & Balalaeva, 1997, i  17). Further, article 22 of the same legislation:
required a clear econom ic agreement, approved by the appropriate 
administrative authority, between the owner o f the land and the com pany 
developing the land, specifying ( I )  the terms and conditions of 
development, and providing (2) full com pensation for all losses in 
connection with development, (3) an agreed-upon share o f the profits from 
the developm ent o f this land, as well as (4) a lease paym ent for the use of 
the land. (W iget & Balalaeva, 1997, % 19)
These regulations were further sustained by a federal decree Concerning Urgent Measures 
fo r Protecting Places o f Living Economic Activity o f the Native Minority Peoples o f the 
North (see Appendix 2.3.). Yet, the federal government has not provided the regulations 
necessary to implement the decree. Thus, especially regions that have no recognised major 
indigenous population base face tremendous challenges with the implementation of the 
decree (Kirillin, 2002). This may explain why, besides the KMAO where negotiations of 
IBAs are ongoing and, from a legal point of view, improving, there is no information 
available about the negotiation of IBAs in other regions of the Russian North (Veselov,
2003). However, the legal awareness of the rights of indigenous peoples, especially regarding 
industrial development on their traditional territory, is steadily growing and resources are 
increasingly developed to further support indigenous organisations in the Russian North (see 
Veselov, 2001; Kirillin, 2002).
2.5. Emerging Theories
IBAs evolved as a pragmatic approach rather than a theoretical discourse to steer and 
control the positive as well as negative development impacts. This is reflected in current IBA 
literature, which generally is sporadic and limited in volume as well as content. Two trends 
in IBA literature are apparent: literature describing IBA experiences of indigenous
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communities from mineral developments, and literature analysing governmental regulations' 
potential for enhancing the success of IBAs. Yet, only a small body of analytical literature 
about IBA experiences is available. This lack of analytical and additional descriptive IBA 
literature has been observed by a number of authors (Kennett 1999a; Keeping 1999; Sosa &
Keenan, 2001; O ’Faircheallaigh, 2004). The reason for the lack of IBA literature is directly 
related to conhdentiality provisions of most IBAs, the limited time and opportunities
available to people typically involved in IBA negotiations to publish their experiences 
(O’Faircheallaigh, 2000b), and the short lifetime of some mines which inhibits actual IBA 
evaluations (see Keeping, 1998). The lack of IBA literature results in a patchwork of 
information.
An exception is the work undertaken by Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh. Studying IBAs for 
more than 12 years, O’Faircheallaigh is a leader in the comprehensive and systematic study 
of IBAs. O’Faircheallaigh worked nationally and internationally on different structural parts 
of IBAs; their socio-economic background (see section 2.3), and their process and content^® 
(see section 2.5.1).
2^.1 Process and Content
The process and content of IBAs are the main structural elements of these 
agreements. While some analysts of IBAs mix the two elements when describing IBAs (e.g. 
Sosa & Keenan, 2001; Kennett, 1999a), O'Faircheallaigh (1995, 2000b, 2004) clearly 
distinguishes between these two. For instance, in 1995, O'Faircheallaigh stated that the 
outcome of IBAs is determined by the bargaining power an indigenous group possesses (i.e. 
ownership to land, the legal context, and the specific nature of the project) and the ability of
^  Currently, O ’Faircheallaigh is working on a com parison o f IBA  contents in A laska, Australia and Canada. 
The data are not yet available. The earliest possible publication date is late 2004.
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the indigenous group to maximize it through appropriate processes and structures. Further, 
O'Faircheallaigh describes key elements for such process, such as the establishment of 
community goals, the need for access to information and resources, the necessary 
institutional structures, the development of effective relations between technical staff and 
community leaders, and appropriate agreement implementation (1995).
In 2000, O ' Faircheallaigh (2(XX)b) expanded his observation regarding appropriate 
processes and accompanying structures of IBAs with the ‘Cape York Model’, which reflects 
approximately eight years of negotiating experience between the Cape York Land Council 
(Northern Territory, Australia) and mineral developers. The Cape York Model is a seven- 
stage linear IBA planning model consisting of the following steps: initiation of process, 
creation of framework for negotiations, information gathering and community consultation, 
establishment of a negotiating position, conduct of negotiations, endorsement and signing of 
a final agreement, and implementation. For each of these stages O’Faircheallaigh specifies 
sub-stages, outlines important tasks, and identifies key players (community, specific 
community members, indigenous specialists, non-indigenous specialists) and their role 
within the process (for the main structure see Appendix 2.4.). While this model has been 
applied by the Cape York Land Council with great success, O’Faircheallaigh states that this 
model does not represent a single best practice in the negotiation of IBAs, but reminds us that 
when evaluating a process one has to take into consideration the actual "contexts in which 
Indigenous people find themselves, the range of the projects about which Indigenous groups 
have to negotiate and the diverse objectives they may wish to pursue” (2000b, p. 2).
It is outside the scope of this thesis to discuss the model in detail; however, there are 
key features of relevance to the following case studies. For instance, O’Faircheallaigh points
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to the importance of conducting an anthropological study as well as a socio-economic 
assessment for the project so that the community, on one hand, understands the impacts of 
the mine and, on the other, has an opportunity to express their aspirations and concerns in 
relation to the proposed project. These studies then can be used as baseline information to
establish a community negotiating position. The set of established community goals will be 
used in a variety of ways: first, as an initial negotiating offer at the outset of the negotiation; 
second, as reference throughout the process for community negotiators and residents to 
review the progress of the negotiation; and third, before signing the agreement as reference 
for the community to evaluate the success of the negotiation.
Current work of O’Faircheallaigh concentrates on the analysis of IBA content. He 
argues that the analysis of IBA content is one way of analysing the overall success of IBAs. 
For that O’Faircheallaigh (2004) proposes eight standardised criteria of evaluation: 
environmental management, cultural heritage protection, rights and interests in land, 
financial payments, employment and training, business development, Indigenous consent 
and support, and implementation measures^ \  However, measuring an IBA solely on its 
content can lead to incorrect results. O’Faircheallaigh acknowledges that the criteria 
described may not be enough to encompass all benefits received. Further, the content of IBAs 
may not reflect the context under which an agreement was negotiated. An agreement which 
may appear weak in terms of its content may be a m ^or achievement for an indigenous 
community (O’Faircheallaigh, 2004). Finally, my own observations in the field have 
demonstrated that the beneOts received from a mineral project are not necessarily limited to 
the benefits outlined in an IBA (see Chapter 5), but go beyond those.
For a detailed description o f these criteria see O ’Faircheallaigh (2004).
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This demonstrates that the analysis of IBA outcomes based on an IBA s content is 
insufficient. Thus, O'Faircheallaigh describes three other ways for analysing IBA outcomes 
based on: (i) the process of negotiating the IBA, as "outcomes may arise before an agreement 
is signed and indeed may occur even if the parties fail to reach an agreement" (2004, p. 4);
(ii) the benefits received directly from the development (short-term benefits); and (in) the 
benefits received through investment and improvement of financial and human community- 
based resources (long-term benefits)^^. However, O'Faircheallaigh states that while looking 
solely at IBA content comprises limitations, it would be impractical to take a more detailed 
approach to analyze and compare a large number of IBAs because of the need for intensive 
field-based research.
2.5.2. Experiences
As established above, the two factors for a successful IBA are an appropriate process 
used to negotiate, implement and monitor the agreement, as well as a content that 
corresponds with the community goals for the project. However, process and content are not 
the only factors influencing IBAs. IBAs are highly complex concepts constructed from a 
great variety of variables influencing their success (Kennett, 1999a). Some variables can be 
categorized as specifically process or content-related. However, other variables are more 
difficult to place as they may affect both process and content (e.g. limited human resources 
available in a community will influence both the process and content of an agreement) or 
neither of them (e.g. the early closure of a mine). As there is no literature addressing the 
nature of outside influences in a systematic manner, an inductive approach to theory building
The kinds of analysis described in points two (short-term  benefits) and three (long-term  benefits), will be 
used to analyze the case studies of this thesis.
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has been employed to determine factors influencing the success of IBAs. IBA experiences 
have been catalogued and then categorised according process, content and other common 
characteristics.
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Table 1: a/W confgnt rg/aW  Impact owf Bgn^ta^ Agrggmgnt gjrpgngncg.^
Process Related Experiences Content Related Experiences
Separate political and business objectives throughout 
the negotiation and im plem entation process (W olfe, 
2001).
Do not negotiate confidentiality clauses as it is to the 
disadvantage of indigenous com munities. It inhibits 
com parison and learning from each other (Sosa & 
Keenan, 2001; O ’Reilly & Eacott, 1998).
Include m em bership actively in the IBA negotiation 
otherwise they may not understand the agreement 
they have to sign at the end (O ’Reilly & Eacott, 
1998).
Do not compromise governance power and the ability 
to monitor and challenge mine operators (O ’Reilly & 
Eacott, 1998; Sosa & Keenan, 2001).
Encourage com panies to talk to com munities 
(O ’Reilly & Eacott, 1998).
Allow for flexible work tim es for traditional activities 
(e.g. hunting) (O ’Reilly & Eacott, 1998; Sosa & 
Keenan, 2001).
Sign the IBA before the Environm ental Impact 
Assessm ent (EIA) to ensure that com munity will be 
consulted. IBA  and EIA  should reinforce each other 
(O ’Reilly & Eacott, 1998; Sosa & Keenan, 2001).
Consider actual level o f com m unity m em ber’s 
education and mining w ork experience when 
developing the IBA content (Aboriginal Econom ic 
Development, 1998).
Ensure the com m unity is united and com mitted for 
the implementation and enforcem ent o f an IBA 
(O’Reilly & Eacott, 1998).
Provide cultural awareness program s and policies to 
avoid conflicts between indigenous and non- 
indigenous workers (O ’Reilly & Eacott, 1998; 
Aboriginal Econom ic Developm ent, 1998; SIWG, 
1996).
Ensure project funding (Sosa & Keenan, 2001). Allow for non-specific em ploym ent provisions (16, 
24), but ensure detailed provisions for financial 
com pensation to allow for enforceability (O ’Reilly & 
Eacott, 1998; Sosa & Keenan, 2001 ).
Allow for periodic evaluation and, if  necessary, 
adaptation o f the agreement (O ’Reilly & Eacott, 
1998).
Do not state in an IBA that its purpose is to receive 
com m unity support for the project (O ’Reilly & 
Eacott, 1998; Sosa & Keenan, 2001).
Consider that confidentiality issues can cause 
problems in implementation o f an agreement. 
(O ’Reilly & Eacott, 1998).
Specify the use of Traditional Knowledge when 
negotiating monitoring provisions for mine site 
(O ’Reilly & Eacott, 1998).
Develop effective implementation plans. (Kennett, 
1999b).
Include dispute resolution mechanism s and avoid 
provisions for penalties (O ’Reilly & Eacott, 1998).
Build community consent for IBA before signing it. 
(O ’ReiUy & Eacott, 1998).
Use clear and sim ple language so people can 
understand the agreem ent (O ’Reilly & Eacott, 1998).
M ost o f these experiences are from  descriptions o f Canadian IBA negotiations because o f available literature. 
Despite the regionally lim ited scope of the inform ation available, it is believed that Canadian IBA experiences 
can give insights into general key factors that contribute to the success or failure o f IBAs.
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D evelop negotiating position through community 
consultation for future review o f the negotiation 
progress, and make sure to clearly outline non- 
negotiable matters (Sosa & Keenan, 2001).
Include in introduction a description of project, its 
phases and duration, estim ated size and required 
infrastructure or refer to docum ent including these 
provisions to have a point o f reference for 
com mitm ents related to the different projects and 
project stages. Describing planned work in detail will 
allow recognising if  an IBA has to be negotiated and/ 
or renegotiated (Sosa & Keenan, 2001 ).
C onsider IBA im plem entation while negotiating -  
set unambiguous roles and responsibilities (Sosa & 
Keenan, 2001).
Account for difficulties of indigenous people entering 
mining workforce, such as lacking experience, 
cultural barriers, and differing educational 
backgrounds (Sosa & Keenan, 2001).
Establish early mechanism  for IBA implementation 
and allocation of cash paym ents (Sosa & Keenan, 
2001).
Take into account financial lim itations when 
negotiating for contents that aim to improve capacity 
building and econom ic diversification (Sosa & 
Keenan, 2001).
D evelop a good plan. M ake sure community 
understands m ining impacts. Take time to consult 
w ith community (Sosa & Keenan, 2001).
Seek environm ental standards that reflect 
com m unities’ needs, and incorporate these within the 
IBA. Existing regulations may be weak or unclear, 
focus on ‘urban life’ and change over time due to 
pressure from  mining industry (Sosa & Keenan, 
2001).
Set clear objectives and roles for negotiating parties 
(Kennett, 1999b).
Keep long-term perspective in mind -  do not settle 
for few jobs and recreational programs at the expense 
o f neglecting provisions for environm ental protection 
and com munity development. Rather ensure that the 
IBA provides for training, skills developm ent and 
economic diversification (Sosa & Keenan, 2001).
Establish conflict resolution mechanism s to avoid 
the use of radical and costly measures such as 
litigation or strike (Sosa & Keenan, 2001).
Provide for statement that specifies that the 
agreem ent will be honoured even if  the mine will be 
sold (Sosa & Keenan, 2001).
Besides IBA experiences clearly concerning process or content, other experiences 
cannot be placed within this structure presented above as they relate to both process and 
content or neither of them. However, these experiences share other common characteristics in 
form of whom they concern: indigenous communities, industry and governments. The 
following table gives examples of clustering experiences according to these categories.
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Table 2: CommwMzfy, govemme/if rg/afecf /mpacf onJ Agregmg/if
Community Related
Experiences
Industry Related Experiences Government Related
Experiences
Develop a long-term  vision about 
mineral developm ent and think 
about how  it can contribute to the 
future generations (W olfe, 2001).
Build good long-term working
relations with indigenous 
communities. (O ’Reilly & Eacott, 
1998)
Confirm  indigenous rights if no 
regulations for IB As are in place. 
(O'ReiUy & Eacott, 1998)
A ccept the financial realities o f 
mining com panies (W olfe, 2001).
Approach the com m unities early 
in the process. (O ’Reilly & 
Eacott, 1998)
Establish parameters for IBA 
negotiations. Do not allow for 
confidentiality clauses. (O ’Reilly 
& Eacott, 1998)
Consider that if C hief and 
Council signs an IBA  and 
afterwards settles land claims, the 
IBA may not be legally binding 
anym ore (O ’Reilly & Eacott, 
1998).
Provide indigenous com m unities 
with access to information. (Sosa 
& Keenan, 2001)
Ensure that indigenous 
com m unities have adequate 
funding to respond to 
developm ent proposal. (O ’Reilly 
& Eacott, 1998)
Start training for m ining jobs as 
early as possible. Start before 
mining operations com mence 
(O ’Reilly & Eacott, 1998).
Provide funding for indigenous 
com munities to pursue 
independent studies (O ’Reilly & 
Eacott, 1998).
Take ad-hoc approaches to assist 
indigenous communities in 
improving their negotiating 
position. (Kennett, 1999a)
Prepare and train people early for 
mine w ork to be able to take 
advantage o f jobs (Sosa & 
Keenan, 2 0 0 1 ).
Consider differences in language 
and culture (Aboriginal 
Econom ic Development, 1998).
Provide funds for programs 
supporting indigenous 
com m unities (e.g. training, 
em ploym ent and social support) 
(Kennett, 1999a).
Encourage indigenous 
com m unity members to stay in 
school (SIWG, 1996).
Allow for com pletion o f EIAs as 
it enables indigenous 
com m unities to include those into 
IBA negotiations (Kennett, 
1999a).
Cooperate with governm ent in 
e.g. environm ental matters as 
they set the regulations and they 
have the com petence and 
resources to assist (O ’Reilly & 
Eacott, 1998).
Assist during IBA process 
through guiding industry early in 
process, providing financial 
assistance to  indigenous 
com m unities and take facilitating 
positions through provision of 
information. It may save tim e and 
money (Kennett, 1999a).
Form a good negotiation team  
that represents all interests in the 
community as well as experts on 
environmental, legal and mining 
issues (Sosa & Keenan, 2001).
Consider to be involved in 
negotiating process if public 
interest is at stake (Kennett, 
1999a).
A last category for summarising IBA experiences includes variables Aat are project 
related. Kennett (1999a) highlights the importance of considering the project related 
variables of IB As as they can significantly shape an agreement. Again, some of these
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experiences overlap with process and content; however, they are not limited to just one of 
these factors.
Table 3: frq /ect fmpoct amZ Agrgemgnt experience.;
Project R elated Experiences
Consider other docum ents negotiated which include typical IBA-related benefits provisions (Keeping, 
1998).__________________________________________________________________________________________
Negotiate project specific benefits (Keeping, 1998).
Be aware o f lim ited time fram e for IBA negotiation due to project lim itations (Sosa & Keenan, 2001).
Bear in mind a possible short mine life (Sosa & Keenan, 2001).
Take into account that in the absence of policy related factors, project related factors may drive IBA 
negotiation (Kennett, 1999a).
Realise that IB As can be influenced significantly by different economic as well as other characteristics of a 
project (Kennett, 1999a)._____________________________________________________________________________
Although not comprehensive, these experiences give clear indications about common factors 
related to the success or failure of IB As. The following section presents a general IBA 
Aumework and discusses the main theoretical components of it.
2.6. Evaluation Framework
The IBA framework developed in this chapter illustrates the key factors and 
components for successful IB As and demonstrates their relationship. The base for this 
framework is the work of O'FaircheaUaigh and IBA experiences cited in current IBA 
literature (section 2.5.). According to these, there are two main factors, the process and 
content of IB As as well as four additional components: community, industry, government 
and project related influences. As discussed earlier, in some cases these components can be 
related to both process and content, in others to neither of them. Hence, these components 
must be treated separately from process and content.
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Figure 1: /mpacf a/wf AgreeoigMf gvaZwario» yrwMgwort
C O N T E N T
SUCCESS
IBA
P R O C E S S
This evaluation framework identifies the main IBA-influencing factors and 
components, and demonstrates their relation to each other. Process and content are central 
within the framework, illustrating their importance to the overall success of an IBA to 
provide local benefits. Both process and content strongly influence each other. For instance, 
the effectiveness of the process used in articulating community goals on the negotiating table 
win influence the content of the IBA, while the IBA's content can include the need to 
renegotiate an IBA if certain criteria are met, thus influencing the process. The four 
components (project related, community related, government related and industry related) are 
added as a secondary layer to the framework, as they, directly and indirectly, can influence 
process and content, as well as the success of IB As. These four components cannot only 
merge with both process and content, but also fuse at occasion with each other. For instance, 
a negative project history may be accounted as a project related factor; however, it also
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influences a community's perspective on a project and thus may shape their actions regarding 
the project. In this case, a factor can be project as well as community related.
Although the body of descriptive as well as analytical literature is slowly increasing, 
there have not yet been criteria developed which would lead to successful IB As. The IBA
experiences listed above are based on the execution of only a few IB As. Thus it would be 
presumptive to create a set of defined criteria for the IBA factors of the proposed IBA
evaluation framework. However, in the absence of such criteria the use of this framework is 
ambiguous and in its execution may depend upon subjective use. Further, as every IBA is 
different and dependent upon a complex net of variables, there is no single ‘right’ approach 
to the negotiation of IB As. Neither process nor content can be predefined for any given 
resource development project. More accurately, IB As are instruments that need adjustment to 
the respective user and project. Referring to his Cape York Model, O’Faircheallaigh (2000b) 
states:
resource developm ent projects are also highly varied in their scale, their 
proximity to Indigenous com munities, their likely profitability, their 
duration, their potential im pact on the environm ent and on cultural heritage, 
the tim e constrains faced by developers and the nature o f the corporate 
structure they employ. Against this background it would be futile and 
counterproductive to prom ote a single, universal model. Rather, accounts 
and critical analyses o f a large number o f alternative approaches would 
allow Indigenous groups a wide range o f options which can be adapted to 
suit their particular circum stances and objectives, (p. 2)
Thus, the proposed IBA evaluation framework may seem too vague to draw definite 
conclusions about the success of an IBA. However, given the current lack of frameworks for 
evaluating IB As, this model may assist in improving the identification of variables for an 
IBA's success. Moreover, the application of this model enhances awareness of the m^or 
factors and components of IBA success and their interrelations. The IBA evaluation 
framework developed in this chapter wiU be used in the remainder of the thesis to evaluate
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the success and failure factors of two IB As negotiated by an indigenous community in the 
Yukon Territory (Canada).
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Chapter 3 : Methodology 
3.1. Introduction
The past chapters have concentrated on describing the development paradigms used 
over the past 50 years to overcome underdevelopment (Chapter 1), discussing some of the
impacts of these paradigms on remote indigenous communities affected by mineral 
developments and presenting a new approach: using IB As to secure short and long-term 
benefits from resource developments (Chapter 2). This chapter presents a research model 
designed to investigate and evaluate the success of IB As. This model is based on the 
theoretical assumptions proposed in the first two chapters. In this chapter, the research 
design, the data gathering methods and the sample selection criteria will be discussed. The 
chapter will conclude by explaining the techniques used for data analysis, and the 
methodological limitations of this research project.
3.2. Research Design
The question this study aims to answer is whether the IB As negotiated by the RRDC 
have provided them with satisfying short-term and long-term local benefits. For the purpose 
of this study, local benefits are defined as being positive results (e.g. employment, training, 
advanced education, social/cultural support with long-term positive consequences) which are 
enjoyed on a community level. The measures of satisfying benefits are first, community 
members' perceptions of the received benefits ('subjective' measure) and second, the match 
of IBA content with the actual benefits received by the community ('objective' measure). 
Measuring the success of the IBA in these independent ways allows for a triangulation of 
different data sets such as comparing the perception of community members versus 
information available from government and industry (Singleton & Straits, 1999).
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There are challenges to answering these research questions. Separating the actual 
negotiation of an IBA from the broader outside context in which the project is situated 
(Chapter 2) is impossible. Thus, in order to evaluate IB As, a wide variety of different data 
sources and data types must be evaluated. Beside the complexity of the IB As, the partial lack 
of data (such as relating to the process of the IB As), and the inherent subjectivity of the data 
(perception of participants in the process), pose additional challenges. To accommodate for 
these, a case study approach has been chosen, as it allows for the evaluation of complex 
processes and offers high validity of the research results. A case study, as Yin (1994) notes 
“is an empirical inquiry th a t... investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real 
context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and 
in which multiple sources of evidence are used” (p. 13). The objective of this study is to 
describe and evaluate the success of IBAs in providing benefits for an indigenous community 
from mineral development. Babbie (2001) refers to this kind of case study as evaluation 
research or program evaluation, and adds that this research type focuses the research design 
on the “purpose rather than a specific method. This purpose is to evaluate the impact of 
social interventions .... Many methods -  surveys, experiments, and so on -  can be used in 
evaluation research" (p. 332). Similar to Yin's (1994) statement. Babbie underlines the 
importance of using multiple kinds of data.
While case studies have several advantages, such as analysing complex phenomena 
and offering high validity of the research findings, this tool also causes disadvantages due to 
its generally low reliability (ability to generalize the research results), and the biases case 
studies are exposed to. However, no research approach is fully reliable and free of biases 
(Yin, 1994). To minimise the disadvantages of case study approaches, it is thus important to
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rigorously structure and perform the research project ,and to be open minded about one's 
biases.
For the purpose of this project, studying IBAs has been divided into a five-step 
process, which has been completed for both IBAs separately. First, the content was identified 
(review of IBA). Second, the process used to negotiate and implement the IBAs was 
investigated (interviews with process participants). Third, other factors determining the 
success/non-success of the IBAs were determined (interviews with process participants and 
others, review of documents). Fourth, to allow for triangulation, the success of the IBAs was 
measured in two ways: through a survey of community members’ perceptions of the success 
of the agreements (survey questionnaire), and through a comparison of the benefits 
negotiated as outlined in the agreements (review of IBAs) and the actual benefits received 
(interviews with process participants, benefits listed in survey, review of documents). Fifth, 
as the success of the IBAs was not identical, differences in content, process and other 
influences were analysed and evaluated as contributing to the success or non-success of the 
IBAs. Comparing the two agreements eased the task of separating causes and effects. For 
example, if a variable was different, but the outcome was the same, it could generally be 
assumed that this variable was of no consequence to the research project; however, if the 
variable as well as the outcome was different, the variable could be of significance. 
Information gained through interviews with directly as well as indirectly-involved IBA 
participants were used for triangulation to ensure the causality of dependent and independent 
variable. Further, this additional information from interviews was also used to analyse 
variables which were similar for both cases, but seemed to inhibit the success of the IBAs 
negotiated.
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33 . Methods and Samples
The data gathering methods used for this study included a variety of techniques, such 
as archival review, partly structured interviews, open interviews, a survey, and participant 
observations. The variety of methods was necessary to allow for triangulation. Moreover, as 
will be discussed at length in section 4.4, the data for this project are widely dispersed and in 
many instances incomplete. Therefore, using a variety of methods was important to fill data 
gaps.
Similar to the need for employing a variety of methods because of the lack of 
comprehensive data, sampling for the interviews, the survey and conversations has been 
broad. The survey sample included every Ross River Dena member as well as other 
community members that were affected by, or directly involved with, the IBAs. As the partly 
structured interviews mainly focussed on the process and content of the negotiated IBAs, the 
sample included anybody who had been involved with negotiating and/or implementing the 
agreements. The sample for open interviews included governmental officials, industry 
managers, former employees of the Faro Mine, and consultants of the RRDC. These 
interviews were undertaken to close knowledge gaps, and receive outside views about the 
IBAs and how they affected the Ross River Dena.
3.3.1. Archival Review
The overall access to information about the IBAs negotiated by the RRDC was 
strongly limited in terms of interview data as well as in documentation. For example, the 
federal as well as the territorial government had no documentation which directly addressed 
socio-economic aspects of the Faro and the KZK mines, such as employment and training of 
Ross River Dena at these mines. An exception was correspondence between the Department
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of Education of the Yukon Territorial Government (YTG) and the RRDDC, which speaks to 
training funds made available to Ross River for mine employment. However, part of this 
documentation acknowledges the overall lack of information available on matters concerning 
this training fund.
Thus, an array of archival documents was sought as additional sources of information. 
These documents included reports, articles, videos, newspaper articles, radio interviews and 
news coverage, as well as statistics and files of the indigenous, federal and territorial 
governments. Some of these archival records gave insights on the history of the Faro Mine, 
while others were more contemporary, and addressed matters of the Faro Mine and KZK 
agreements, issues addressing Ross River Dena participation in resource developments and 
recent developments of the RRDC.
3.4.1. Partly structured Interviews
The partly-structured interviews (for the protocol see Appendix 3.1.) with key people 
involved in the negotiation and implementation of the IBAs were important as these were 
structured to answer complex questions about the process, content and success of the 
agreements. It was planned that, given their knowledge about the process of negotiating and 
implementing the IBAs, as many key people as possible would be selected for this interview 
to receive a clear picture about the events surrounding the IBA processes. Unfortunately, 
only a limited number of people participated in this interview:
Dorothy Dick Mining Liaison Manager of the KZK Mine and Manager of the
RRDDC
Kathlene Suza former Mining Liaison Manager of the Faro Mine
Testloa Smith Land Use and Resource Development Officer of the RRDC
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Mike Rawlings former CEO of the RRDDC and active negotiator of the IBAs 
Of these interview participants, only two were able to answer most questions relating to the 
process used to negotiate the IBAs. The other two interview participants were not able to do 
so, because they started at a later stage of the IBA process (implementation). Consequently, I 
did not receive sufficient data to entirely rebuild the IBA processes. The overall low number 
of participants in the partly structured interviews can be related to the financial breakdown of 
the RRDDC, which was managed by two different teams. Uncertainties about who got the 
company into financial difficulties, and why, led community members to be cautious about 
the topic. Hence, many of the people directly involved in the negotiation and implementation 
of the agreements were unwilling to participate in the partly structured interviews; however, 
three of these people agreed to informal talks about their views on the success of the IBAs.
3.4.2. Open Interviews
Open interviews were held with 34 individuals representing the RRDC/RRDDC, 
government and industry who had insights on the IBAs negotiated by the RRDC and other 
IBAs negotiated in the Yukon. These insights partly came through work on the IBAs and 
partly through work with the Ross River Dena which were affected by the IBAs. The insights 
of all of these people were extremely valuable. People involved in the process commented on 
the process as they perceived it. Other people offered explanations for the problems and 
challenges encountered while working on the IBAs. The interviews were kept open to 
accommodate for the specific knowledge participants had regarding the IBAs. The questions 
covered in the interview focused on the success, and the two initially identified factors of 
success; process and content.
53
3.43. Survey with Community Members
The survey (for copy see Appendix 3.2.) was designed to gain a greater understanding 
of four issues: benefits Ross River Dena members received; their perception of the success or 
non-success of the agreements; their evaluation of the input community members had
regarding their concerns and wishes while the IBAs were being negotiated; and their opinion 
on how to approach resource development in the future in order to increase benefits flowing 
to the community. The survey was kept as straightforward and simple as possible to allow as 
many people as possible to participate in it. In a limited number of cases it was necessary to 
further explain the questions. Most of the surveys were completed while I was present. Only 
one survey was completed without my presence and sent to Prince George, as I had to leave 
the community. The sample was made up of all community members over the age of 24; this 
was the age group which could have worked in the mines while the IBAs were ongoing '^ .^ 
Among the survey participants were two non-indigenous participants, who were included 
because they both worked with the RRDC on implementing the IBAs. Overall, 31 individuals 
participated in the survey.
3.4.4. Observations
The task of observing the study subject can take different shapes. While participant 
observation In the traditional sense entails that the researcher participates directly In the topic 
of study, they can also participate by smdylng the topic directly at the scene of action after 
the action has been completed. Babble (2001) refers to that kind of observation as one part of 
Geld research and adds that there are "varying degrees of 'particlpantness' -  that is, the 
degree of actual participation In daily life" (p. 278).
^  The original sample was made up of all com m unity m em bers over the age o f 25. However, some youth o f the 
age o f 24 had already worked under the IBAs, and thus the sample group has been lowered to age 24.
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During my five month stay in Ross River I participated increasingly in the daily life 
of the Ross River Dena. I had many opportunities to observe the life, culture, politics and 
administration of the First Nation, as I lived in Ross River Dena households. I took part in
traditional activities, such as hunting, gathering and playing handgames, and I attended 
several meetings of the RRDC and the KTC, especially on resource development related 
issues. Furthermore, I had the chance to participate in the water license renewal process for
the Faro Mine (more particularly, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act process), 
which started in the spring of 2002. Taking part in these activities enhanced my 
understanding and appreciation of the Ross River Dena’s traditional way of life, and their 
decision-making processes within the community and the Kaska Nation. In particular, 
observing and participating allowed me to be aware of the obstacles and problems faced by 
this First Nation concerning resource development decisions. As matters concerning the 
IBAs were sensitive, staying for this length of period and participating in different aspects of 
community life was necessary to gain the trust of the people regarding the research project.
3.4. Analysis
The total time span of the data gathering stretched over a period of 18 months and 
included the collection of qualitative as well as quantitative data. To analyse the wealth of 
information, the qualitative data have been coded according to categories arising out of the 
IBA framework (e.g. success, process, content and outside influences) and the content items 
of the IBAs (e.g. commitment, employment, training and scholarships). The data were colour 
coded according to the association of the informant (e.g. RRDDC, Ross River Dena 
members, industry and government). Then, the data were placed in a matrix to build clusters 
of related information. This practice facilitated the triangulation of data. Quantitative data.
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arising mainly from the survey with community members, were put into spreadsheets and 
analysed according to their frequency. Following the analytical strategy of explanation 
building, the research results have been used throughout the process to revise initial 
theoretical statements and propositions. Yin (1994) points to the danger underlying this 
approach: drifting off the actual research topic. This has been avoided by constantly referring 
to the original research question, and the development and constant adaptation of a list of 
necessary interview participants and questions to carry on the research process.
3.6. Limitations
The study faces a variety of limitations. First, as this project is being performed with 
only one community, the conclusions are not universally applicable. Instead, the results 
gained in this study should be used to build hypotheses for further projects. Second, the 
project focuses strongly on the involvement of the indigenous community. Within this 
research project only limited attention is paid to views, challenges and limitations 
encountered by the developers or government. Third, the case study does not investigate the 
negative impacts the development posed upon the indigenous community, but solely 
concentrates on the benefits the IBA provided. Fourth, as the content of IBAs is confidential, 
there are limitations regarding its publication or public exposure. The RRDC as well as Teck 
Cominco agreed that the content of the IBAs can be used for the project; however, Teck 
Cominco decided that the specific content of the KZK agreement could not be published. 
Therefore, the argumentation about the benefits received through this IBA is reduced to 
information that is already in the public domain.
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Chapter 4: Case Study 
4.1. Introduction
This chapter will introduce two case studies that will be used to investigate the 
theoretical propositions of Chapter 1 and 2 which outlined the theoretical conditions for 
indigenous development and presented one of the currently prevailing tools for indigenous 
people to obtain economic development through mining projects. The case studies used were
chosen according to three eriteria: (i) remoteness, (ii) the availability of funding, and (iii) the 
negotiating parties of the IBA (indigenous community and industry). The Ross River Dena 
were a perfect fit for this set of criteria. Located in a remote region of the Yukon Territory, 
this indigenous group had decades of experience with mineral development and more than 10 
years of experience with negotiating IBAs directly with industry. Unfortunately, all of their 
IBAs were relatively short lived (which tends to be typical in the Yukon Territory). Thus, the 
IBAs chosen as case studies were of speeial significance because of the size of the projects 
and the length of the agreement: the Faro Mine and the KZK Mine. This chapter will start by 
introdueing the Ross River Dena and their experience with resource development in their 
area. Then the RRDC’s experiences with IBAs will be described and the two ease studies 
presented.
4.2. The Ross River Dena
The Ross River Dena are part of the Kaska Dena; the Kaska, linguistically, are part of 
the Athabaskan language group. The Kaska Dena traditional territory stretches from the 
MacMillan Pass in the Yukon Territory to the Northwest Territories (NWT) border to 
Williston Lake in British Columbia (BC) (see Figure 2).
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The political organisation of the Kaska Dena is the Kaska Tribal Council (KTC). Besides the 
Ross River Dena First Nation the KTC consists of the Liard First Nation (Watson Lake, 
Yukon), Lower Post First Nation (Lower Post, BC), Dease River Band (Good Hope Lake, 
BC), and the Kwadacha Band (Fort Ware, BC). Each of these communities has their own 
Council (Chief and councillors). The traditional territory of the Ross River Dena is located in 
the southeast comer of the Yukon with transboundary claims in northern BC and the NWT^^.
As Kaska elders opposed the idea o f creating separate territories for the live Kaska communities, ± ere  are no
maps with distinct RRDC boundaries.
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This First Nation consists of a group of at least five distinguishable family groups from Blind 
Creek, Ross River, Sheldon Lake, Pelly Banks and Frances Lake^.
The community of Ross River is located about 360km northeast of Whitehorse at the 
confluence of the Pelly River and the Ross River, 10km from the crossing of the Canol Road
and the Campbell Highway. It is situated in the midst of the mineral rich Tintina Trench 
which stretches from the northern end of the Rocky Moimtains (southeast of Watson Lake) to
Yukon, Alaska (northwest of Dawson City). The community consists of about 335 people, 
whereof approximately 80% are Indigenous and 20% are of other ancestry. (Aboriginal 
Population Profile 2001, 2003)^’. The largest source of employment is the governmental 
service sector (federal, territorial and First Nation administration). Jobs in the construction 
sector are dependent upon the projects of a particular year, but tend to be strong overall^^. 
Furthermore, transportation, retail, accommodation, and food services provide employment. 
Employment through mining development varies greatly, depending upon metal prices, and 
the number and status of mining developments (Yukon community profile 1999, 2002).
Many of the jobs in the government (federal and territorial) and in the private sector are taken 
by the non-indigenous population. An unemployment rate for the indigenous population of 
44.8% (Profile of Yukon Aboriginals 2001,2003)^^ compared to an overall 36.8%
^  By the 1940s, the trading posts at Pelly Banks, Sheldon Lake and Frances Lake were closed, so people tended
to m eet in early summer near the Ross River trading post to trade fur and wait for animals to  recuperate from 
the stress o f winter time. M eanwhile the family groups would meet to exchange news, gather inform ation about 
animal populations, m ake wildlife m anagem ent decisions, entertain them selves with m usic, dances and 
handgames, get married and so on (Arthur John Sr., personal communication, 2002). W hen government 
introduced services to the area, it assumed all o f these fam ily groups were one indigenous group and termed 
them the “Ross River Band” .
W hile the indigenous population o f Ross River stayed relatively constant from 1996 to 2001, the overall 
population decreased by approxim ately 4.3 percent, indicating an out-m igration o f the non-indigenous 
population. This statistic coincides with the closure o f  m ines in the late 1990s.
For example, in summ er 2000 the new school/college building was finished which created em ploym ent for 
Ross River residents; however, since then only small projects such as single family houses were completed.
According to the same statistic, Ross River has the highest unem ploym ent rate for indigenous residents o f  all 
Yukon indigenous communities.
59
unemployment rate for all Ross River inhabitants (Community Profiles 2001, 2(X)3) gives an 
indication of the disproportionate allocation of jobs in the community.
Community statistics indicate that, compared to the Yukon average, Ross River has a 
high percentage of young people (14 and younger) and older people (65 or older). The 
working age population is relatively low compared to the Yukon average (Yukon 
Community Profiles, 1999). In its recent publication "Yukon Community Profiles", Human 
Resources Development Canada argues that the relatively small working age group of the 
indigenous population may be an indication of people moving outside of town for 
employment opportunities. However, it may also be an indication of the high death rate of 
the adult population related to drug abuse and suicide (see Dimitrov, 1984, p. 89, table 4.1; 
own observations in the field). These statistics give some indications of the challenges faced 
by the Ross River Dena, such as lack of employment opportunities in the community, the in- 
and out-migration of non-indigenous populations, according to the jobs available, and the 
multiplicity and severity of social problems faced by the indigenous population. As in other 
remote communities, many of the social problems faced by the Ross River Dena can be 
traced back to resource development experiences introduced by non-indigenous (see Chapter 
1 and 2). While some of these experiences were positive, many of them had severe 
consequences for the community.
43. Ross River Dena Experiences with Resource Development
The history of the Ross River Dena during the past century has been closely linked to 
resource developments on their traditional territory. For the purpose of this study, the 
following section will concentrate on describing the three most important stages of change:
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(i) the fur trade from the 1840s onward; (ii) the building of the Canol Road and Canol 
Pipeline in 1942-44; and (iii) the development of the Faro Mine (Sharp, 1977).
43.1. Fur Trade
Traditionally, the local economy was based on hunting, fishing, trapping and snaring 
activities as well as the gathering of plants and building materials. The Ross River Dena had 
a long trading tradition with the Tlingit through Tagish middlemen. In the 1800s, fur trade
started with non-indigenous people, initiated through the establishment of trading posts on 
Ross River Dena traditional territory (Weinstein, 1992). Building on skills and activities the 
people practiced for many centuries, trapping‘s  did not extensively change their traditional 
lifestyle (T. Smith, personal communication, January 2004). Instead, the fur trade catered to 
the indigenous economy in terms of the goods produced as well as the products traded 
(Weinstein, 1992). While the fur trade led to “shifts in land use and the Indian economy to 
accommodate an increased focus on fur bearing animals ... the limited information 
[suggests] that dislocations [of people] were minimal” (Weinstein, 1992, p. 50).
4.3.2. Canol Pipeline and Canol Road
The traditional Ross River Dena lifestyle continued fairly unchanged until the 
building of the Canol Road and the Canol Pipeline in 1942-44, which transported oil from 
Norman WeUs (NWT) to Whitehorse in order to provide resources for anticipated World 
War Two activities in the North PaciBc. However, the war concentrated in the South, and the 
pipeline was found to have extensive leakages, making it an expensive and environmentally 
damaging project (Grant, 1988). The sudden influx of more than three thousand American 
soldiers into Ross River influenced the community considerably. The sudden exposure of the
Traditionally, the Ross R iver Dena used non-m etal traps such as dead falls. W ith the opening o f trading posts 
in the area, RRD gained access to metal traps.
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formerly isolated community to a large number of outsiders brought diseases and death to 
many Ross River Dena, mostly children and elders (Charlie Dick, personal communication, 
2002), and exploitation of local women (Weinstein, 1992). One community member, elder 
Arthur John Sr., worked as a guide on the Canol pipeline. He finally had to quit his work
when his children got seriously sick in Ross River. Arthur John Sr. further remembers that 
many local people worked when the pipeline was constructed; mostly wood cutting (Arthur 
John Sr., personal communication, December 29, 2003). Indirect impacts occurred through 
the connection of the community by road to the Alaska Highway, which facilitated the 
provision of governmental welfare to the community.
4.3.3. Faro Mine (until 1992)
As in other communities, residential schools in the 1950s and day schools in the 
community in the early 1960s changed the former subsistence lifestyle of the Ross River 
Dena, as it was no longer possible to live in the bush all year round (Miller, 1971). However, 
the most important impact on the traditional lifestyle had probably the development of the 
Faro Mine in the mid-to-late 1960s.
The Faro Mine"*^ * was a lead and zinc mine located 75km west of Ross River (see 
Figure 2). It was developed in the Bhnd Creek region on the slopes of Jgda which 
was referred to by the people as their 'food basket' because of the abundance of wildlife, 
fish, berries, plants and building material. It was one of the two most important gathering 
areas of the community. After the opening of the mine, the region was mainly abandoned by 
the Ross River Dena because of the intense activities in the area, the in-migration of more 
than a thousand outsiders, and the decreasing numbers of animals in the region. Instead the
The Faro Mine is also called Anvil M ine and Cyprus-Anvil M ine according to the ow ner of the time. 
^  This mountain does no longer exist; it has been dism antled as part o f the m ining operations.
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region became the economic engine of the Yukon Territory for more than two decades, 
accounting for about one third of the Yukon's economy (Weinstein, 1992).
Intense mining development started with a boom of staking and exploration activities 
in the mid 1960s. The original owner of the mine was the Anvil Mine Corporation Limited 
(Aho, 1966). From 1965 to 1970, the service town of Faro was built 25km outside of the 
mine to accommodate the work force. To guarantee the development of the Faro Mine, the 
government provided financial assistance (at least $28 million) for infrastructure, including 
the building and upgrading of the Campbell Highway, the building of a bridge crossing the 
Pelly River in Faro, man-power training, and the provision of substituted electricity 
(MacPherson, 1978a). In turn. Anvil Mine Corporation Limited signed an agreement in 1967. 
“Her majesty wishes to encourage and support the proposed mining development in order to 
expand the economic activity of the Yukon Territory and to provide employment 
opportunities for Canadians, particularly those residents in the ... Territory” (MacPherson, 
1978a, p. 123). According to the Anvil Agreement the company agreed to undertake efforts 
in hiring at least 5% local residents, particularly those of indigenous descent, in the first, 10% 
in the second and 25% by the fifth year of operation (MacPherson, 1978a). At no point in 
time have these goals been achieved. While "the company ... felt that . . . i t  had met its 
obligations with respect to the employment of northern natives the government maintained 
that, although the letter of the agreement may have been followed, the spirit of the agreement 
had not been met” (Harper, 1982, p. 11)'^ .^
Mine production started in 1969, and notwithstanding shut-downs in the 1980s and 
1990s due to low metal prices and changes in ownership, continued operating until January
The government initiated a study to investigate reasons for the failure o f providing em ploym ent for First 
Nations in Faro. This study concluded that the com pany’s insensitivity towards indigenous people’s attitudes 
and aspirations were the cause for the non-success o f the agreem ent (M acPherson, 1978).
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1998. The Faro Mine had significant impacts on the surrounding communities, such as the 
development and expansion of infrastructure (communication, energy, and social services) 
for Faro and Ross River, and associated increase of secondary developments. As for Ross 
River, Aho (1966), one of the men staking the Faro deposit, described the changes in the mid 
1960s.
The former small com m unity o f Ross River has exploded with 
development. In 1965 it contained only about 30 people, mostly Indians, 
and a small trading post, with minimal facilities, no school, no electricity, 
little or no supplies, no sewer or water; and flying services were chartered 
from W hitehorse 125 miles away by air. A few months later, spurred by the 
heat o f the exploration activity, Ross River attained a developm ent area 
status and boasts a fixed wing and helicopter base. Northwest Expediting 
and Com m unication base, Territorial Government base for road crews.
Atlas Explorations base with atomic photospectrom eter -  geochemical 
laboratory, electricity and water, a school, a modern motel and restaurant, 
several new perm anent houses, two new churches, a large and well-stocked 
store, fuel and propane depot, and many other facilities o f an organised 
com munity (p.5).
In addition to the changes within the community, the expansion of infrastructure, such as the 
construction of the Campbell Highway as part of the ‘Roads to Resources’ program^ as well 
as the reopening of the North Canol road'*  ^further opened Ross River to outsiders. The 
positive impacts encountered by the Ross River Dena were minimal and mostly tied to the 
beginning stages of intensive mine developments in the Ross River area, from about 1965- 
1970. In this time, local people were hired by exploration companies for prospecting, staking 
and line-cutting. Indigenous workers were preferred to non-indigenous workers as they were 
‘bush wise’ and harder working than their co-workers (Miller, 1971; Sharp, 1977). The Ross 
River Dena favoured this work over work in the mine as it was closely related to traditional 
activities. However, with the stagnation of mineral exploration in the early 1970s these 
employment opportunities diminished fast (Miller, 1971).
^  The 'Roads to Resources' program was initiated in 1959 under the Diefenbaker government to improve the
overall infrastructure o f the Canadian North and thus, to increase the number of resource developm ent projects. 
The North Canol was reopened to access mineral rich regions along the Yukon/Northwest Territory border.
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Besides limited positive outcomes, the opening of the Faro Mine had severe 
repercussions for the Ross River Dena in the form of social, cultural, environmental and 
economic impacts. Various studies outlined these experiences; some of the authors were 
direct observers in the community (e.g. Miller, 1971; Sharp, 1977), while others were 
scholars pursuing studies in the community (e.g. Dimitrov, 1984; Weinstein, 1992). 
According to these studies, most of the impacts can be traced back to alcohol abuse, racism, 
violence against the Ross River Dena, and ignorance toward their culture and traditions. The 
impacts include among others, high death rate related to alcohol and drug abuse (e.g. car 
accidents, burning in cabins, freezing in the cold, suicide)'^ family violence and break-up, 
rape, loss of self-respect (Miller, 1971; Sharp, 1977). Further impacts encountered were 
related to land use.
These include: problem s o f  access to harvesting areas; changes in the 
quality o f resource; com petition from  other users o f the same resource; 
changes to resource abundance; changes to people’s ability to harvest the 
resources; and disturbance to cultural and economic life. (W einstein, 1992,
p. 110)
These negative impacts experienced by the Ross River Dena are similar to those of many 
other indigenous communities located in remote regions throughout the world (see section
2.4.1.). Yet, the impacts on the community were not formally acknowledged until 1990 when 
Curragh Resources, then owner of the Faro Mine, offered to address the problems created by 
the mine (Weinstein, 1992).
In fact, the mine was opened without assessing the socio-economic impacts the 
development would have on the local indigenous population (Weinstein, 1992). Even to this
^  Alcohol-related accidents started in 1960. Since 1970, almost every year at least one person died related to 
drugs and alcohol (Weinstein, 1992) (The statistic Weinstein is referring to goes only until 1989; however, the
trend has not discontinued. In fact, in 2003 at least two people died o f drug and alcohol-related accidents.)
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point, no comprehensive study has yet been completed to fully understand the impacts of the 
Faro Mine on the First Nation community. This prompted Weinstein (1992) to ask:
W hat were the conditions that perm itted developm ent to proceed without 
consideration for conflicts? At best the blame can be laid on ignorance of 
the significance o f  the land to Indian culture and economics. A t worst blame 
can be laid on racism. Somewhere between the two lies the ethnocentric 
conviction that the replacem ent o f hunting, trapping, and fishing as the 
means for making a living by wage-labour and com mercial trade represents 
an inevitable and universal step in human progress. In this view bringing a 
m ine developm ent to the “door-step” o f an Indian band represents an 
opportunity to modernize and share in the benefits o f progress. Concerns 
about land use conflicts did not have to be addressed because hunting, 
fishing and trapping were not considered to be legitimate or significant 
econom ic endeavours. The expectation was that they would be gladly 
replaced when wage labour opportunities were available, (pp. 6-7)
Yet, the operation of the Faro Mine did not lead to the modernization of the Ross 
River Dena, nor provide other benefits to the indigenous community. Employment was 
limited to five individuals who quit within the first years of mine operation (MacPherson, 
1978a), but the impacts were felt by the community as a whole. The Anvil Agreement struck 
between government and industry had no effect on improving the status of the Ross River 
Dena at the mine site (Sharp, 1977). Focussing strictly on employment and training the 
agreement offered neither enforcement nor encouragement to increase benefits to the Ross 
River Dena. Instead, the people felt increasingly marginalized and not taken seriously in their 
attempt to communicate their concerns about environmental matters at the mine site'^ .^
The size o f the current mine site (including claims) extends over approxim ately 360 square kilometres with 
approximately 147 square kilom etres o f disturbed land. It consists o f three open pit mines (the Faro, VanGorda 
and Grum pit), one refilled pit, several waste rock dumps, one tailing pond (size: approxim ately three square 
kilometres; depth: up to 60 feet; volume: approxim ately 53,000,000 tonnes o f tailing slurry), settling ponds, 
fresh water facility and dam, several creek diversions around the prem ise and a haul road stretching over 15 km, 
connecting the pits, waste rock dumps, and mill building (T. Smith, personal com m unication, Decem ber 18, 
2003 .
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4.4. Ross River Impact and Benefits Agreements
Although not exclusively focussing on indigenous peoples' interests, the 1967Anvil 
Agreement has clear elements of an IBA as it specifies terms which intend to increase 
indigenous peoples' participation in and benefits from a mining project. As with other early 
agreements in Canada and Australia, the Anvil Agreement was negotiated between the 
federal government and the resource company. Anvil Mine. This agreement proved to be 
unsuccessful from the perception of the RRDC as it provided neither employment nor other 
benefits to this First Nation community.
The early 1990s marked a new starting point for the Ross River Dena in their effort to 
gain more control and receive more benefits from the Faro Mine, as Curragh Resources 
Limited agreed to negotiate an IBA directly with the community to secure, among other 
things, employment, training and business opportunities from the Faro Mine. However, with 
financial responsibilities mounting from the Westray coal mine accident in Nova Scotia in 
1992, and fines issued at the Faro Mine for equipment insufficiencies (MacKay, 1997), 
Curragh Resources declared bankruptcy and an interim receiver (Deloitte and Touche) took 
over the business at the Faro Mine.
When Faro Mine matters were discussed in court in 1993/94, the RRDC took the 
stand in court to present their interest in the Faro Mine area. The result was a condition on 
the future purchasers of the mine to complete an IBA with the RRDC. Eventually, Anvil 
Range, mostly composed of former directors of Curragh Resources, bought the Faro Mine 
and signed an IBA with the RRDDC^ in December 1994. It was a ground-breaking event for
The RRDDC is the business arm  o f the RRDC. It was founded in O ctober 28, 1982 by the RRDC. Initially, 
the RRDDC was active through the Dena Store, a convenience store in Ross River. In the early 1990s, the 
RRDDC gained importance through the negotiation and im plem entation o f IB As with mining com panies such 
as Anvil Range and Com inco. Approximately 23 different businesses were opened and managed through the
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the Ross River Dena; the first time in 25 years the government had acknowledged the 
interests and rights of the people in the Faro Mine. The RRDC/RRDDC negotiated several 
IB As in the 1990s, including IB As for Grew Creek, Ketza River, Wolverine and the Kudz Ze 
Kayah (KZK) mines. Except for the Wolverine Mine'^ ,^ aU agreements have been signed. 
Every one of these agreements varies slightly in content and in the duration of usage. This 
study will focus on the efficacy of two agreements: the Faro Mine IBA and the KZK IBA. 
These two agreements were chosen as both agreements were negotiated at the same time 
(1994-95) and endured for about the same length of time (approximately 3 years). Further, as 
these two agreements were the longest IB As in place, they were of great importance to the 
community.
4.4.1. Faro Mine Impact and Benefits Agreement
The Faro Mine IBA was signed on November 8, 1994 containing provisions for 
employment, business opportunities, training, housing and payments for scholarships and 
trapline support. In September of 1996, operations at Faro slowed down due to low metal 
prices, and on December 20, 1996, almost everybody was laid off. People were hired back in 
October/November 1997. In January 1998 the mine finally closed, which ended the Faro 
Mine IBA (K. Suza, Mining Liaison OfEcer for RRDC/Anvil Range, personal 
communication, November 7, 2003).
On Apnl 21,1998 the Ontario Court, once again, appointed Deloitte and Touche as 
the Interim receiver of the Faro Mine. After the completion of several studies, the mine 
finally was shut down for good. Reclamation planning is currently underway. The estimated 
clean-up costs are $200-6(X) milhon, depending upon the money available and the clean-up
RRDDC (see Appendix 4.2.) (Zanasi, 1998). By 1998, the RRDDC experienced serious financial difficulties 
and closed its doors. The business became deregistered as o f M ay 29, 2003.
The exploration work stopped before the IBA could be signed.
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measures taken. It is anticipated that the mine site will not be returned to its former state 
because of the scale of environmental damage and the costs associated with such an 
endeavour. Therefore, water treatment and control will be necessary for a long time to come.
4.4.2. Kudz Ze Kayah In^pact and BeneBts Agreement
The KZK Mine is located 160km south of Ross River, west of Finlayson Lake (see 
Figure 2). The Finlayson Lake region is well known by mining companies for its mineral
deposits, including lead, zinc, gold, and recently emeralds. Corporations such as Expatriate, 
Teck Cominco and True North Gems have mineral interest (stakes) in this area.
In 1993, while Cominco planned exploration work in the KZK area, it started 
negotiating an IBA with the RRDC, and, as in the case of the Faro Mine, more specifically 
with the RRDDC. Similar to the Faro Mine Agreement, the KZK agreement incorporated 
employment, training and business opportunities for the Ross River Dena. The agreement 
was implemented between 1995 and 1998. However, exploration results showed that the ore 
body is tainted with selenium, which makes it costly, and to this point unprofitable to extract 
the lead and zinc, thus, exploration work stopped in 1998. Currently, Teck Cominco and the 
RRDC are exploring the possibility of opening a land block which is immediately attached to 
the KZK property. This area bears high hopes for being the core deposit in this area.
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Chapter 5: Analysis 
5.1. Introduction
This chapter analyses the Faro Mine and KZK agreements negotiated between the 
RRDC and industry, in terms of their success in providing benefits to the Ross River Dena, 
by drawing on development theory (Chapter 1 ), and IBA literature and emerging IBA 
theories (Chapter 2). The order of analysis corresponds with the theoretical framework in 
Chapter 2: success of the IBA, process, content and other influences.
5.2. Success
The success of the Faro Mine and KZK IB As has been measured in two independent 
ways: (i) through the perception of the Ross River Dena regarding the benefits received 
through the agreements; and (ii) through a comparison of the benefits negotiated in the 
agreements with the benefits actually received.
5.2.1. Ross River Dena’s Evaluation of the Impact and Benefits Agreements
The Ross River Dena’s perception of the benefits received through the IB As has been 
measured through data gathered in a survey with community members (Appendix 3.2.). The 
analysis of this survey revealed that community members perceived the benefits received 
from the KZK agreement to be more positive than those received through the Faro Mine 
agreement. The survey participants were asked to measure their satisfaction with the benefits 
received on a scale fiom 1 (not at all) to 5 (very good). More than 90% of the respondents 
evaluated the benefits received through the Faro Mine as less than 3, whereas the KZK IBA 
was assessed by the majority of respondents as 3 (see Figure 3)^. Thus, the survey 
respondents made two clear statements: first, neither of the IB As was considered to be very
*  W hile differentiating the answers received by gender it becam e apparent that, overall, women evaluated the 
IB As worse than men. However, no effort has been undertaken to find out why this is the case (for respective 
charts see Appendix 5.1.).
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successful in the long-term, and second, notwithstanding the overall assessment, the KZK 
agreement was deemed to be more successful than the Faro Mine agreement.
Figure 3: Dena witA recgfvgd t/irowgA tAe /mpuct and
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5.2.2. Comparison of Agreements’ Content with Benefits Received
The following section compares the content of the agreements^' with the short and 
long-term benefits actually received. In order to communicate the results of the analysis, 
ratings have been given ranging from good, fair to poor. The ratings depended upon the 
matching of the IB As’ contents with the benefits experienced by the Ross River Dena paired 
with an evaluation of circumstances and efforts taken by both parties to achieve positive 
results. More specifically, the rating "good” was applied when the benefits outlined in the 
IB As were received and had positive impacts for community members. The rating ’Tair” was 
used when the benefits outlined in the agreement were offered, but had few positive impacts 
for community members. "Poor” has been given when the benefits outlined in the agreement 
have not been provided or if they have been provided but they provided no positive outcomes 
for community members. E  none of the above ratings could be applied because of
While the content o f  the Faro M ine IBA has been derived directly from the agreement, the content o f  the
Kudz Ze Kayah IBA has been based on data published in Henderson and Voogd (2001).
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insufficient information, they were marked as '^uncertain". The evaluation does not rely 
solely on the benefits that have been offered by industry, but also analyses if the benefits 
received actually benefited the Ross River Dena. As such, this evaluation is meant not only 
to demonstrate the performance of the companies, but also the ability of the people to receive
benefits from the mining projects. Following is a detailed justification for how the ratings 
have been applied. The ratings are summarized later in Table 6.
Coopération
Both IB As include a promise of cooperation. While representatives from the Ross 
River Dena as well as Cominco expressed their satisfaction with the level of cooperation, the 
opinions of interview participants about the quality of cooperation between the RRDC and 
Anvil Range varied from limited (RRDDC representative) to good (Anvil Range 
representative). Similar perceptions were reflected regarding the quality of IBA review 
meetings. While regular quarterly meetings have been held between Cominco and the 
RRDC/RRDDC in Ross River, the meetings between Anvil Range and the RRDC/RRDDC 
were less consistent. In fact, a representative of Anvil Range complained that meetings 
would be set up in Faro, and without notice the Ross River Dena would not show up. 
However, documentation and my own observations demonstrate that often it is not 
intentional to miss meetings, but a matter of community officials having to deal with intense 
schedules. For example, in the 1990s, the RRDC dealt with an array of issues, including the 
management of 3-5 mining developments and land claim negotiations. Many of the meetings 
included the need to travel to Whitehorse (420km) or Watson Lake (location of the KTC 
Office, 380km), which takes a tremendous amount of time away from daüy community 
needs. It is an unfortunate practice of the RRDC not to inform other meeting participants of
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the inability to attend a meeting. Possibly, this situation could bave been avoided tbrougb 
meeting in Ross River.
As bas been encountered by Anvil Range, when consulting the RRDC regarding a 
water license appbcation for the proposed Grizzly prqject^^, the attendance of community 
members was improved when meetings of the developer were joined with meeting sessions 
of the RRDC or similar events. Also, in the beginning of Cominco's consultation process 
with the RRDC, they encountered poor participation of the community members in the 
meetings. Instead of regarding the non-participation as a statement of no interest or no 
concern by the people, Cominco hired a mining liaison officer who visited the elders and 
asked for their comments and views regarding the proposed project. In general, the 
cooperation between the RRDC and Anvil Range has been evaluated as fair and that with 
Cominco as good.
Contracting
Both agreements outline the necessity of creating business opportunities. These 
business opportunities have been acted upon by the RRDC/RRDDC in two ways: 
establishing local businesses, and starting joint ventures with larger enterprises, such as 
Beaver Lumber, Pacific Petroleum and Norcan. Local businesses created include line-cutting, 
staking and construction enterprises. Both Anvil Range and Cominco used local businesses 
for their operations. However, a review of the documentation shows that there were more 
contract opportunities (at least 5-6 in 2 seasons) through Cominco than through Anvil Range 
(in 1.5 years only 3-4 local contract opportunities). Considering the differences in size of 
both projects, the percentage of contracts given to Ross River Dena was far higher at KZK 
than at the Faro Mine. The large size as well as Faro's producing status may have
This project was a proposed underground pit on the Faro M ine property.
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complicated finding appropriate small-scale contracts for Ross River Dena businesses. At 
least on one occasion a contract at Faro could not be unbundled to allow for smaller business 
ventures to take the offer. Contracts in both mines were usually short-term (3-4 weeks).
Anvil Range and Cominco have both used Ross River Dena joint venture businesses; 
however, these joint ventures proved to be of little benefit to the people in terms of 
employment opportunities. Although community members were hired in the start-up of the 
joint venture, only a few people remained employed for a longer period of time. There is no 
indication why that was the case. Financially, some of the businesses provided monetary 
benefits; however, as all joint ventures were terminated shortly after the mine closed, no 
long-term benefits were accrued by the community. Thus, the short and long-term benefits 
through business opportunities have been evaluated as fair and poor for the Faro Mine and as 
good and poor for KZK.
Employment
KZK was an exploration camp with a working schedule of two-weeks-in, two-weeks- 
out which provided free accommodation and food. The work offered was mainly seasonal 
and associated with 'bush work' such as camp construction, prospecting and cooking. Table 
4 shows the type and number of jobs taken by Ross River Dena in 1995-1996. There are no 
comparable data available for the years 1994,1997 and 1998.
By 1998, KZK had opened more than 50 positions to Ross River Dena (including 
local contractors) and provided more than 165 months of working hours. The percentage of 
indigenous employees compared to that of other workers was more than 50%. The number of
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people quitting their job in 1995 was 19% and in 1996 11%^ .^ Noticeably, Cominco 
representatives -  from the Vice President to the supervisors at the mine site -  participated in 
cross-cultural training which aimed to create an increased understanding of Ross River Dena 
culture and traditions, and as such, established bridges of respect. Further, communication 
was recognised as an important factor in retaining good relations. Documentation confirms 
that Cominco, instead of terminating employees, sought the assistance of the RRDC/RRDDC 
to solve critical situations.
Table 4; Numbers and Type o f Ross River Dena Employment at Kudz Ze Kayah
Num ber o f people_________
Type o f em ploym ent_______________________________1995_____________________1996
Camp Construction W orker 4 7
Bull Cook 3 3
Cook 1
Cam p Assistant 2
Core Splitter 3
Prospector 1
Geochem ical Assistant 1
Geophysical Assistant 1
Camp Security 5
Note. As this list is com prised of data from different docum ents, it may not be comprehensive; however it gives 
a general overview about the jobs taken by the Ross River D ena in the years 1995-96.
In contrast to the bush work provided at KZK, the employment available to Ross 
River Dena at the Faro Mine included mainly labouring and truck driving (see Table 5).
Table 5: ant/ typg River Dena emp/oyment at tAe Faro Mine (October 7994-
96j
Type of employment______________________________ N um ber of people
Labourer 15
Truck Driver 11
Pit Utility 4
Dewatering 2
Student 3
Apprenticeship 3
M ining Liaison M anager 1
The reports for KZK do not distinguish who ended the em ploym ent (the com pany or the employee). Hence, 
terms such as termination are not used. There seems to be a greater acceptance by Com inco that people may 
stop working. In such cases, new em ployees were hired.
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Ross River Dena employment numbers were constantly changing because of their high 
turnover; however, at no time did Ross River Dena employees account for more than 5% of 
the Faro Mine workforce (assuming an approximate total workforce of 400 to 5(X) people). 
Comparisons between Ross River Dena employees and other indigenous employees offer 
interesting distinctions between employment patterns of both groups (Figure 4 and Figure 5). 
Figure 4 illustrates that Ross River Dena employment termination within the first three 
months was 39% higher than that of other indigenous employees. Further, Figure 5 
demonstrates that Anvil Range terminated 12% more Ross River Dena than other indigenous 
people while the Ross River Dena participation in full-time positions was 27% lower than 
that of the other group.
Figure 4: Comparison o f work duration between Ross River Dena and other indigenous 
at rAf Faro Ming (DcfoAer 7P94-96)
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Employment Status
In 1995, special efforts were undertaken to hire Ross River Dena members. An Anvil 
Range manager was sent to Ross River where he hired 17 people for the mine; however, the 
majority of people left within the first month. This manager had no knowledge about why 
people left, but assumed that they did not like millwork. He further stated that Anvil Range 
did not go ‘chasing everybody’s heels’, which summarises the general approach taken by the 
company. After 1995, Ross River Dena had to apply for jobs by resume. Anvil Range 
terminated 33% of all Ross River Dena employees, mainly because of poor work ethic, 
including lacking punctuality, absenteeism and inappropriate workplace behaviour (e.g. 
leaving the workplace during scheduled hours)^. M ^or reasons the Ross River Dena gave 
for not carrying on with a job included high rent payments in Faro and dislike of shift work.
Further motivations were determined through interviews and review of 
documentation. For instance, the three mining liaison ofGcers working for the RRDC 
independently stated that one mryor barrier for carrying on work was the inability of Ross 
River Dena employees to communicate problems to their supervisors. Once criticized, they
54 For a broader discussion o f Ross River D ena’s lacking work ethic see section 5.5.2.
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would rather leave the job than discuss problems and concerns with co-workers and 
supervisors. Interviews with the Faro Mine liaison officer and government o^cials, as well 
as documentation point to Ross River Dena not feeling accepted by non-indigenous co­
workers at the Faro Mine. One of the reasons was the negotiation of a Collective Agreement 
between the United Steelworkers of America (USWA 1051) and Anvil Range (first signed 
with Cyprus Anvil) which outlined, among other things, the requirement for workers to join 
the union, the application of seniority rules for promotions, and special leaves of absence 
available for indigenous employees to pursue traditional activities. The application of 
seniority rules had huge impacts on the Ross River Dena as they could not become a truck 
driver instantly, but had to work as a labourer for at least 2-3 months. However, the average 
time for Ross River Dena labourers was less than 3 weeks before quitting. To overcome this 
obstacle, training was offered through Yukon College (paid through the Ross River Training 
Trust Fund^^) which enabled the people to start directly as truck drivers. The result was a 
significant increase in average work time to more than 35 weeks.
Non-indigenous workers voiced their discontent against a special treatment of the 
Ross River Dena. Thus, Ross River Dena employees did not like to take special leaves of 
absences because of the tension it created between themselves and their co-workers. Further, 
they felt that the union rules were too stringent in terms of work times (shift work) and 
promotion (the Ross River Dena felt non-indigenous people were favoured). On July 26, 
1996, a meeting was held between the RRDC/RRDDC, representatives of Anvil Range and 
members of the Steelworker's Union to discuss the difficulties arising Aom the employment 
practices at Anvil Range for Ross River Dena members. This meeting highlighted the need 
for greater flexibility and tolerance from Anvd Range and the Union towards the Ross River
’ For more information on the Training Trust Fund see section ‘Training’.
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Dena. The meeting minutes indicate that a decision was made to go ahead with cross-cultural 
training for the "vice president and their senior managers and down to the exploration guys". 
However, this training was never undertaken. Reviewing interview transcripts of a study 
undertaken by Dimitrov (1983), it seems that despite the Faro Mine IBA, many of the 
reasons for low Ross River Dena employment in the 1980s were unchanged (e.g. challenging 
conditions to get to work, and poor communication between indigenous and non-indigenous 
workers).
Comparing the employment provided by Cominco with that of Anvil Range, the 
former, for its size, was more successful in employing and retaining Ross River Dena 
workers. This can be related to a number of reasons, such as the type of jobs, the working 
conditions, and Cominco’s commitment to increasing indigenous work participation (cross- 
cultural training and communication with the RRDC/RRDDC in overcoming problematic 
situations). However, the impacts of the work and the on-job training provided have been too 
short to leave good long-term benefits within the community. Thus, the KZK IBA was rated 
good in the short-term and fair for the long-term. The rating for the Faro Mine IBA took into 
account the initial effort undertaken by Anvil Range to employ Ross River Dena, as well as 
the limited effort adopted to sustain this local workforce (cross-cultural training, 
consideration of RRDC concerns regarding the collective agreement). Consequently, it has 
been rated as good for the short-term and poor for the long-term.
(only Faro Mmg Z8A)
The Faro Mine agreement included the provision of summer jobs for indigenous 
students from Ross River. The minimum age for acceptance was 18 years. Documentation 
shows that in 1995 three students were hired: one student quit within the first three weeks.
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and for the other two, no data are available. In the following years. Anvil Range was open to 
hiring more summer students; however, nobody applied for the positions. No information is 
available about why that was the case. Overall, this position has been evaluated as fair for the 
short-term and uncertain for the long-term as no information is available.
Apprenhcej/iip pmgmnw fon/y Faro Ming /BA)
The Faro Mine IBA outlined opportunities for five Ross River Dena to enrol in 
apprenticeship programs including heavy equipment mechanic, industrial mechanic, 
industrial electrician, machinist, industrial instrument mechanic and welder. Documentation 
shows that three individuals started apprenticeships: two as heavy equipment mechanics and 
one as an electrician. One of the heavy equipment mechanics resigned after five months 
work, the other two were not able to complete their apprenticeships within the lifetime of the 
mine, yet they completed their certificates on their own (i.e. Trade Ticket). Interview 
participants mentioned that it was difficult to find applicants with enough education to pass 
the test for entering the program. One individual further stated that the entry level has been 
lowered to allow people to start with the program, but he doubted that lowering the level 
truly helps the Ross River Dena in completing an apprenticeship program. The program 
assisted at least two individuals to start furthering their professional skills; however, as both 
were not able to finish the program within the lifetime of the mine. Anvil Range's 
contribution has been evaluated as fair-good for the short and long-term.
Trainmg
The Faro Mine IBA stated that given available resources and interest. Anvil Range 
would offer RRDC members training in the area of mining technology, geology and 
exploration, business administration, accounting, environmental technology, use of
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computers, resource development planning, purchasing and warehousing, assaying and 
contract law. However, except for the mining liaison manager, no other Ross River Dena 
received formal education from Anvil Range. Instead, the Faro Mine required employees to 
'work up the corporate ladder', starting with simple labour in the pit and mill. Workers were 
given the opportunity to become a truck driver only after at least 2-3 months of work. 
Training for tradesmen was provided through Yukon College. Similarly, Cominco offered 
on-the-job training opportunities, and relied on further advanced training offered by the 
Yukon College. The courses at the Yukon College (Ross River Campus) were funded 
through the Training Trust Fund that was managed by the Ross River Development Society 
(indigenous and non-indigenous board members) which was in place from 1996 to 1998.
This trust fund originated through payments from the RRDDC, YTG Department of 
Advanced Education, and corporations such as Expatriate, Westmin Resources, Columbia 
Gold and Cominco. Anvil Range did not contribute to the fund, which was ill-received by the 
RRDDC who wrote in a letter to YTG “Anvil Range could take a lesson on corporate 
responsibility". YTG contributed $100,(XX) to the fund in 1996 and 1997 acknowledging that 
these funds are necessary to prepare the Ross River community members for mining 
activities in their area. It is uncertain how much money was available in the trust fund 
overall.
During its lifetime, the college increased its program drastically, offering a variety of 
courses in the area of human development, mining and other subjects, which were taken by 
approximate 50-60 people. Interview partners have evaluated the success of this training 
initiative differently. An employee working out of Whitehorse to facilitate the training at the 
Ross River Yukon College campus stated that the training offered was highly beneficial for
81
the Ross River Dena in the short and long-term. However the coordinator of the Ross River 
Yukon College campus, as well as the instructor of life-skiU training, doubted the benefits of 
the training. They stated that the abrupt stop of mining activities in 1998, and the related loss 
of employment opportunities to local residents, made the training offered ineffective in 
providing benefits to community members. In particular human development courses, which 
were designed to prepare people for work environments through improving self-esteem and 
confidence, were reliant on work accessibility after completion of the courses. As mining 
activities have not picked up since the Faro Mine and KZK ceased their operations, the 
professional skills acquired have not led to better employment in the long-term. Thus, the 
short and long-term benefits from the courses given are highly dependent upon the time and 
the subject of the courses offered.
In addition to payments into the training trust fund, Cominco sent three young men to 
the British Columbia Institute of Technology in Vancouver for a technology program. 
However, none of these three men stayed for more than one semester, because of low grades 
and/or homesickness. Cominco representative Tony Keen stated that it is probably better to 
educate people close to home. The match of the beneBts outlined in the agreement with the 
actual benefits received have been evaluated for the short and long-term as poor for the Faro 
Mine IBA, and as good and fair for the KZK IBA.
The Faro Mine IBA outlined a payment of $35,000 which would be used for 
scholarship payments to Ross River Dena post-secondary students. Cominco negotiated 
scholarship payments for every year the mine would operate. As the KZK Mine remained an 
exploration camp, no formal scholarship payments were made. It is difficult to obtain reliable
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information on matters surrounding the Anvil Range scholarship payments. It is still unclear 
who managed the scholarship trust fund which was created to oversee the payments. 
However, it is clear that the scholarship trust fund was set up in 1996 (late, considering that 
the IBA was signed in November 1994) with payments for two years ($70,000). Students had
to apply to a committee appointed by Anvil Range and the RRDC, and were chosen 
according to guidelines developed between Anvil Range and the RRDC. Five indigenous
students from Ross River received scholarships. However, the amount was so small 
(approximated $250 per semester) that at least one student did not consider reapplying for the 
scholarship. Rather, she decided to rely on student loans. Considering the small number of 
students receiving scholarships and the limited time they have been paid (up to two years), 
the question of what happened to the unused money remains. Neither the former RRDDC 
and RRDC accountants, nor the mining liaison manager were able to give information about 
the whereabouts of these funds. In light of the late establishment of the fund and the small 
benefits it provided for applicants, the benefits for Faro have been evaluated as fair for the 
short-term and poor for the long-term.
Both the Faro Mine and the KZK IBA included provisions for establishing mining 
liaison positions. While the costs for the Faro Mine position were split equally between the 
RRDDC and the mining company, the costs for the KZK position were covered by Cominco 
entirely. These positions were created to facilitate hiring of Ross River Dena, and to improve 
cross-cultural communication between the RRDC/RRDDC and the mine. The working place 
of the two managers differed; while the Faro Mine liaison officer worked mainly in the 
human resources department of Anvil Range, the KZK mining liaison o%cer worked within
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the RRDDC office. This had implications on the portfolios held by both individuals. While 
the Faro Mine liaison officer was engaged extensively in activities outside the IBA, the KZK 
mining liaison manager worked full-time in the interest of the RRDC. The Faro Mine liaison 
ofGcer appreciated the widened work spectrum; however, it is questionable if the diversion of 
focus assisted in improving the working conditions at the mine for RRDC members. Further 
differences in approaching the job were revealed in independent interviews with both 
officers. While the Faro Mine liaison officer stated that she treated the position as a '9 to 5' 
job (hence, she was not available on week-ends), the KZK liaison officer articulated that, 
disregarding business hours, it was imperative to be available at all times to workers and 
industry to solve problems.
It is difficult to assess the impacts the different approaches to the position had on the 
discrepancies between employment conditions at the Faro Mine and the KZK Mine. Yet, 
taking into account the training received by the Faro Mine liaison manager and the general 
efforts made to improve the working relations between the RRDC/RRDDC and Anvil Range, 
the benefits received have been evaluated in the short-term as fair, and poor-fair in the long- 
term. The evaluation of the KZK mining liaison position took into account the commitment 
of Cominco to pay the whole position, the commitment of the officer to put all effort into 
providing job opportunities for the RRDC members, as well as the fact that the KZK mining 
liaison officer is still employed to undertake tasks such as property security and 
environmental monitoring (e.g. water sampling, monitoring caribou). Thus, the beneGts 
received from the KZK mining liaison manager were evaluated as good for both short and 
long-term.
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ManaggmgMf Co»/)' Faro Mme /BAj
The Faro Mine IBA speciOed that as soon as a Ross River Dena fulfills the 
requirements for a management position and a position becomes available, this person would 
be hired by Anvil Range. Kurt Forgaard (former president of Anvil Range, 2003, personal 
conversation) remembers that the RRDDC initiated discussions on this topic. He stated that 
the Faro Mine liaison was probably the closest to being able to take the job; however, that 
she was not interested in the job and in learning the mining business. Yet, the Faro Mine 
liaison officer does not remember having been approached with this subject. Thus this 
section was evaluated with poor for the short and long-term.
Board o f Directors (only Faro Mine IBA)
The Faro Mine IBA included stipulations that if the RRDC held 2% of Anvil Range 
shares or more, they would receive a seat on the Board of Directors. As the RRDC did not 
own any shares, this provision was not applicable.
Environment
Both the Faro Mine and the KZK IB As outhned that Anvil Range and Cominco 
would follow environmental policies set out by government; in particular, the regulations 
specified in the water licenses for each mine. The question of the protection of the 
environment versus the operation of mines is a highly contentious topic for RRDC. A history 
of more than 30 years of environmental degradation on mine sites and the mines' 
surroundings aU through the Ross River Dena traditional territory, and carelessness about 
local people's views and concerns, has left Ross River Dena knowledgeable and, at the same 
time, suspicious of mining impacts on the environment. This is especially true for matters 
concerning the Faro Mine. The RRDC insisted that the Faro Mine water license did not
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include sufficient conditions to protect the environment. Consequently, any incident at the 
Faro Mine was treated with suspicion. The former Anvü Range senior environmental 
engineer stated that environmental standards at the Anvd Range were very good compared to 
those of other mines. He added that Anvd Range was committed to good environmental 
standards. However, he also recads two controversial issues over time: raised ammonia 
levels, which were resolved through amending the water license; and smad spids occurring 
when redding heavy trucks, which was finally solved through the use of a new fuel dispenser 
and the development of proper procedures.
Documentation revealed further environmental failures at the mine. On February 18, 
1996 the Metafina Chemical building^^ was found containing rusted barrels with very toxic 
chemicals leaking into the soil. While the barrels with the most toxic substances (carbon 
disulphide) were shipped to Alberta, 23,000 litres of other chemicals were dissolved (10%) 
and put into the Faro Mine tailings. A further spill occurred around August 17-18, 1996, 
“when a pipeline broke in a building used for producing explosives. Thousands of litres of 
water poured through the plant and then into a ditch beside Rose Creek”. After first 
disregarding the severity of the spill, a federal civil servant later stated “the spill was more 
harmful than his ofGcials Grst believed". The RRDC was greatly concerned about effects on 
drinking water, effects on fish and other animals. Further, as some Ross River Dena members 
still used the area for hunting and trapping activities, the Council was upset that Anvü Range 
neglected to contact them about the issue. In a letter to the RRDC, Anvü Range stated “we 
accept your comment that Anvü was negügent in advising RRDC of the spül of copper- 
contaminated water. However, in no way was this meant to reflect our commitment to the co­
operation agreement between Anvü Range Mining Corporation and the RRDC". For the
’ This building was not owned by Anvil Range, but was located on Anvil Range property.
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RRDC this incident was additional proof of the disregard for their concerns regarding the 
environmental viability of the land.
In addition, during the four years of operation, the Ross River Dena have not been 
engaged by Anvd Range in any environmental study at the mine site. Except for $10,000 
paid in 1997 to the RRDC to review a water license application for the Grizzly project (a new 
pit planned on the Faro property), the community have not been involved or consulted on any 
environmental issue. A RRDC ofGcial added that, at the time Anvil Range intended to start 
up the Grizzly project, company representatives came to the community to give presentations 
on the environment; however, the vocabulary of the oral and written presentation was highly 
scientific and thus alienated people from the meetings. After discussing the matter with Anvil 
Range representatives, efforts were made to present information in a more understandable 
way, yet with only limited success. Considering the numbers of spills which occurred, the 
inability of the RRDC to participate in studies and the frustration in communicating with 
Anvil Range on these matters, the short and long-term environmental benefits have been 
evaluated as poor.
The cooperation in environmental matters at KZK was perceived differently by the 
Ross River Dena than that at the Faro Mine. A management advisory committee was 
established with representatives from Cominco and the community. This board offered an 
avenue to discuss concerns and answer questions regarding the environment, employment, 
training and business opportunities. The two main concerns regarding the environment at the 
KZK site were the health of the caribou whose calving grounds are near to the mine site, and 
the water quality of the streams which are connected to one of the largest lakes in the Ross 
River Dena traditional territory; Frances Lake. At least one study on caribou has been
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undertaken using scientiAc as well as traditional knowledge. Cominco seemed to be 
responsive to the concerns of the RRDC and incorporated measures into their design to avoid 
environmental hazards. Further, a heritage study has heen conducted to investigate traditional 
use and artefacts in the mining area. A questionable undertaking is a proposed airstrip, which
is strongly opposed by the RRDC. As the project was put on hold, this matter is still 
outstanding. Because of their commitment (demonstrated through including Ross River Dena
concerns in the overall project design and the undertaking of studies important to the 
indigenous people) Cominco’s environmental cooperation with the RRDC has been 
evaluated in the short and long-term as good.
Trapline Support
Both mines contributed to a trapper’s trust fund: Anvil Range was supposed to pay 
$25,000 per year while Cominco agreed to two annual payments of $35,000. By January 
1996, Anvil Range had contributed $25,000 and Cominco $105,000. Documentation gives no 
further indication of payments made. Further, considering Anvil Range’s shut-down from 
December 1996 to October/November 1997 and the financial difficulties encountered by the 
end of 1997, it is highly possible that Anvil Range did not make any more contributions to 
the fund. The fund was set up by the trapping committee in 1996, which was accountable to 
the RRDC. During its two-year lifetime, the trust fund served a variety of purposes: annual 
payments of $1,500 to approximately 30 elders, supplements to Ross River Dena trappers, 
training, education of children, bunting trips to provide meat for elders and wages for 
coordination of the fund. To justify elders and trapping supplement payments, the recipients 
had to provide receipts for purchased trapping and hunting equipment. The fund was set up to 
slowly accumulate money for future use; however, as the mines closed during 1997-1998, all
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money was spent within the two years the fund was in place. Given the differences in 
commitments to the contributions made for the fund, the beneAts received from the Faro 
Mine project were evaluated for the short-term as fair whereas those from KZK were 
considered to be good. The ratings for the long-term are uncertain because of the lack of data. 
Co/Mmwnify pro/get
According to the Faro Mine IBA, in the years when Anvil Range was profitable, the 
company would provide community support services based on best effort. According to
documentation. Anvil Range contributed $2,700 from November 1994 to January 1996. 
Asked about donations from Anvil Range and Cominco for social and cultural purposes, staff 
of the Margaret Thompson Centre'’^  in Ross River could not recall any donations from Anvil 
Range, but several contributions from Cominco on different occasions. Documentation 
shows that Cominco contributed to run a Community Treatment Centre in Ross River, 
(affirmed by personal conversation with D. Parker, January 19, 2004). The contributions 
from both companies have been evaluated for the short-term as fair for Anvil Range and 
good from Cominco. The long-term benefits from both agreements are uncertain.
Housing (only Faro Mine IBA)
The Faro Mine IBA outlined the equal sharing of costs for 25 new trailers ($28,(XX) 
per trailer) for the RRDC. The trailers were transported and set up in Ross River. Mike 
Rawlings (November 2(X)2, personal conversation) states that these houses were of great 
benefit to the RRDC. Still, at least one Ross River Dena member maintains that the costs for 
installing the trailers were unexpectedly high (more than three times the cost of the trailers), 
creating a huge financial burden on the community. Thus, he argued, the houses had little 
positive impact on the community. However, the high instalment costs were caused by a
57 Centre for social activities and assistance as well as health matters.
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Ross River Dena contractor. Further, to this point in time, Ross River experiences a constant 
housing shortage. The 25 trailers provided by Anvil Range are a predominant sight in the 
community. The trailers have must alleviated RRDC housing pressure considerably, in the 
past as well as at the present. Thus, the provision of housing has been evaluated as good in 
the short and long-term.
Tax Advice fonZy Faro Ming TBAj
The RRDC/RRDDC was offered the sharing of cost for tax advice with Anvd Range 
through the Faro Mine IBA. According to Kurt Forgaard (2003, personal conversation) an 
offer to share tax advice had been made, but the offer had not been taken up by the 
RRDC/RRDDC. Mike Rawlings (November 2002, personal conversation) confirmed that 
this offer had not been taken; however, there is no information available about why (e.g. if it 
was not wanted, if it was too expensive). Hence, the rating uncertain was given.
Payment fo r  Activities to retain Right o f First Proposal (only Faro Mine IBA)
The Faro Mine agreement set out that Anvil Range, given its profitability, would 
make annual compensation payments of $100,000 to the RRDDC on December 31 of every 
year^^ to retain the "Right of First Proposal"^^. As of January 30, 1996, only one payment of 
$100,000 had been made to the RRDDC^. No documentation about further payments is 
available. The Faro mining liaison officer does not recall any further payments. Further, 
given the financial difficulties encountered by Anvil Range (see above) it is highly possible 
that Anvil Range paid only $1(X),(XX) to the RRDC between the signing of the contract in 
November 1994 and the closure of the mine in February 1998. Therefore, the benefits
^  The brst payment was due on January 24, 1995.
The Right o f First Proposal means the right to have priority for any new exploration activity in the Faro M ine
area (see below).
According to a report by the aboriginal mining liaison officer for the Faro M ine from  January 23, 1996, Anvil
Range had already missed one of the two paym ents at this point in time.
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received through these payments have been evaluated as poor-fair for the short-term and poor 
for the long-term.
Fifjït CalZ OM ExpZoration (onZy Faro AfZng ZBA)
Anvil Range reserved the right for first bids for any exploration work in a 50 rmle 
radius of the Faro Mine area through annual payments (see above). However, as no new 
exploration activities took place outside the Faro Mine, this clause has not been taken 
advantage of by Anvd Range.
The ratings given in the above sections have been summarized in Table 6.
Table 6: General overview o f the benefits received through the IBAs
Benefits Faro M ine IBA K ZK  IBA
Short-Term Long-Term Short-Term Long-Term
Cooperation Fair Good
Contracting opportunities Fair Poor Fair-good Poor
Em ploym ent opportunities Fair Poor Good Fair
Sum m er jobs Fair Uncertain n/a"
Apprenticeships programs Fair-good Fair-good n /a "
Training Poor Poor Good Fair
Scholarships Fair Poor n/a*
Aboriginal Liaison Officer Fair Poor-fair Good Good
M anagem ent position Poor Poor n/a"
Board of directors n/a" n/a"
Environment Poor Poor Good Good
Trapline support Fair Uncertain Good Uncertain
Community project supports Fair Uncertain Good" Uncertain
Payment to retain Right o f First 
Proposal
Poor-fair Poor n /a "
Housing Good Good n/a"
Tax advice Uncertain n/a"
First call on exploration activities n/a' n/a n/a"
Part o f agreement content but not obtained because conditions were not met.
These sections were not applicable to the KZK IBA.
As the table indicates, the benefits received through the Faro Mine IBA in the short-term are 
evaluated as mainly fair and in the long-term as mainly poor, whereas the benefits received
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through the KZKIBA were evaluated for the short-term as good, and for the long-term as 
fair. Considering that the survey of the Ross River Dena's perception was undertaken at a 
time when long-term benefits can be observed, it is striking that this perception coincides 
with the analysis summarised in the Table 6. The above results of community perception, and 
comparison of IBA content and the benefits received is further supported by statements of the 
mining liaison officers for the Faro Mine and KZK and industry representatives. While both 
the Faro Mine liaison and the president of Anvil Range agreed that the Faro Mine IBA was 
unsuccessful, the KZK mining liaison officer and Cominco managers closely involved with 
the KZK IBA expressed their satisfaction with the success of the KZK agreement. This leads 
to the question of why the agreements have been evaluated so differently.
5.3. Process
The process used to negotiate and implement the agreements was similar, though with 
some distinctions. The negotiation of both agreements happened within the same year along 
with the negotiation of at least one other IBA for the Ketza River Mine. Chapter 22 of the 
Umbrella Final Agreement stipulates that Yukon First Nations should be given economic 
opportunities, and therefore be included in planned projects. However, the chapter is open for 
interpretation, und thus difficult to rely on. Therefore, IBA negotiations are generally 
initiated through the water licensing process; companies must obtain such a license, and First 
Nations can threaten to oppose them. It is uncertain what, in particular, triggered the 
negotiation of the IB As under investigation. As stated earlier, a court order (R. v. Curragh 
Inc.; May 7, 1994) designated that any future buyer of the Faro Mine had to negotiate an IBA 
with the RRDC and report on the agreement to the court. Yet, Kurt Forgaard (2003, personal 
conversation) stated that the negotiation of the agreement was independent of any court
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decision, but initiated by the need to receive a water license. Meanwhile, Tony Keen (2002, 
personal conversation) stated that, in the case of the KZK mine, it was not the need for the 
water license, but the desire of the company to have an agreement with the RRDC that 
promoted the negotiations. Hence, in the absence of land claim agreements, the means to 
negotiate an agreement are uncertain; however, there seems to be a general trend that the 
need to obtain water licenses is a leverage tool for First Nations.
The negotiation of the agreements was undertaken by a negotiating team comprised 
the Ross River Dena Chief and councillors, the CEO of the RRDDC and a further community 
member. The team was established to negotiate economic benefits from planned 
developments on Ross River Dena traditional territory. The usual approach taken by the team 
was to approach the companies to discuss main points of the agreement and then to 
communicate the offer in community meetings so as to receive advice from the members. 
Then, the negotiating team went back to the negotiating table and so forth. Usually, the 
agreement was accepted by community members when reviewed for the third time and 
consequently signed. In the case of the KZK Mine, Cominco insisted that 75% of all 
community members had to sign the agreement to ensure members’ approval of the 
agreement. This has not been the case for the Faro Mine^\
The amount of funding available for the IBA negotiations differed greatly. While for 
the negotiation of the first agreement (Ketza River Mine) money was accessible from 
different government funds, the negotiation of the Faro Mine agreement was funded through
Question number 7 of the com munity survey intended to investigate the degree o f RRD input into the 
negotiation o f the IB As. From a scale o f 1 (not at all) to 5 (very good) people stated that the KZK IBA offered
more opportunities to give input to the IB As than the Faro M ine IBA (see Appendix 5.2.). Unfortunately, no 
information is available for why Ross River D ena perceived differences in their input to the negotiation. One 
explanation is Com inco’s requirem ent of 75 % o f the people having to sign the agreement. Another explanation 
is that Cominco hired a person to go to elders’ houses to seek inform ation for a heritage study.
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the Resources Access Negotiation Program, which offered approximately $84,000 for the 
negotiation of the agreement. As the funding received through the Resource Access 
Negotiation Program was limited to an annual amount, no money was available from 
government to negotiate the KZK IBA. However, with the signing of the Faro Mine IBA, the 
RRDDC received an annual payment of $100,000, which then was used to negotiate the KZK 
agreement. Further, Cominco contributed funds to negotiate the agreement, and, after 
signing, paid a $250,000 signing bonus. One major difference, in terms of the process used to 
negotiate the IB As, concerns the completion of complementary studies. Whereas no detailed 
socio-economic studies have been completed for both projects to investigate the impacts of 
the mine on the Ross River Dena, at least a traditional use and a caribou study have been 
undertaken for the KZK project to investigate the presence of culturally important sites and 
the condition of the Finlayson caribou herd.
As for the implementation of the agreements, mining liaison officers were appointed 
for both mines to oversee and assist in the implementation of the agreements. Both officers 
had to monitor and report the benefits received by Ross River Dena members on a monthly 
basis to the RRDC and the RRDDC. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, meetings were held 
with both companies at a more or less regular basis. In summary, according to the data 
available both processes were fairly similar except for the Traditional Use Study (TUS) 
undertaken for the KZK project. Thus, it is questionable if the process itself could have 
caused the differences in the IBA outcomes.
5.4. Content
Analogous to process, the content of both IB As is very similar. As presented in Table 
6, the agreements are composed of the same core elements: employment, training, business
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opportunities and compensation payments. These elements are typical for a wide number of 
IB As negotiated in the 1990s^ .^ The Faro Mine IBA includes a few more benefits including 
scholarship payments, apprenticeship programs and housing. It is interesting to notice that 
the provisions for apprenticeships and housing were the few rather successful benefits
received by the community.
In the survey completed with Ross River Dena and community members closely
involved with the management of the IB As, participants were asked about their opinion with 
regard to which benefits should be included in future IB As. Noticeably, the three most 
common answers (provision of employment, training, and community involvement in the 
project) have been fulfilled by Cominco to a much higher degree than by Anvil Range. 
Further, survey respondents were asked how they would like to see development going 
ahead. The most common response was that it should include: the protection of the land, 
water and animals; the requirement for reclamation after mine closure; respect for their 
traditional landownership; the use of traditional knowledge in the design and operation of the 
mine; and respectful communication and understanding of cultural differences. Here again, 
Cominco has met these criteria (applicable to this point of mine exploration), whereas, from 
RRDC perspective. Anvil Range did not. The fact that both IB As were similar in content 
(Cominco actually provided less beneBts on paper than Anvü Range), but were evaluated 
differently in terms of their success, indicates that in the above discussed case studies, it was 
not the content or process of the agreements which influenced their overall success, but 
additional factors.
(see Henderson & Voogd, 2001; Kennett, 1999a)
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5.5. Additional Influences
As explained in Chapter 2, the success of the IBA is further shaped by additional 
influences. These can be grouped into three types: project-related influences, community- 
related influences and industry-related influences. These types are not exclusive, but may
merge at occasions.
5.5.1. Project Related Influences
Project related influences are an important factor for the success of the IBA. This 
study demonstrated that the success of the Faro Mine agreement was influenced by the 
history of the mine development. The RRDC had, at the time of signing the IBA, a twenty- 
five year history of being ignored by government and industry regarding their concerns for 
the well-being of the environment and their community. Further, commitments were made in 
the past which influenced the management of the IBA such as the Collective Agreement and 
the IBA negotiated (but not signed) with Curragh Resources. The Collective Agreement 
limited RRDC/RRDDC ability to adapt working patterns at the mine to accommodate for 
cross-cultural challenges. The IBA negotiated with Curragh complicated matters as it 
occasionally led to confusion about the content and intent of the Faro Mine IBA. Further, 
many survey and interview participants pointed to their negative experiences with racism and 
the deterioration of the environment at the Faro Mine, which, arguably, may pre-date the 
signing of the Faro Mine IBA. Finally, the working conditions offered at the Faro Mine (e.g. 
shift work, low paying jobs, need to commute between Ross River and Faro and need to pay 
rent in Faro) were financially less favourable than those offered at KZK (for a comparison 
see Appendix 3.3.). These project related factors influenced negatively the success of the 
Faro Mine agreement.
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In comparison, the KZK project with Cominco as owner was new in Ross River Dena 
traditional territory. Cominco had the opportunity to build good relations right from the 
ground. This included the completion of TUSs on caribou migration and historic sites in the 
KZK area. Further, the work at the KZK camp was mainly related to bush activities which
suited people’s skills and life style. In contrast to the Faro Mine shifts (4 day shifts, 4 days 
off, 4 night shifts) the schedule at KZK (two-weeks-in, two-weeks-out of the camp^^) better 
fit the needs of the workers. Also, Ross River Dena employees made up the majority of the 
KZK workforce, which assisted in them feeling accepted by co-workers. It was of financial 
assistance to the workers that living expenses were low in the camp as accommodation and 
food were provided. Also, as the employment was organised directly through the RRDDC, 
Ross River Dena members did not pay income taxes. Additionally, living in the camp limited 
the amount of alcohol consumption, and assisted punctuality as less travel to work was 
required. Finally, there are indications that many Ross River Dena preferred short-term work 
over long-term commitments, offering the opportunity to pursue traditional activities while 
being able to earn wages which pay for hunting and trapping equipment.
5.5.2. Community Related Influences
Community related influences had tremendous implications on the limited success of 
the agreements. As the influences are numerous, they have been sorted into two categories:
(i) challenges created by the nature of mining operations and (ii) challenges faced by the 
community. Mining operations are defined by certain elements, such as the fast start-up and 
shut-down of mining operations due to dependency on changing metal values, the exhaustion 
of the resources, and the high costs of mining. Changing metal prices on the world market
The shifts varied if  a contractor provided the work. One person recounts that the w orking times in the first 
year were 21 days in the camp, 21 days off, and in the second year 6 weeks in the cam p and 1 week off.
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trigger the fast pace of the start-up and closure of mining operations, which causes 
difficulties to effectively prepare for mining developments for example in terms of acquiring 
the necessary information for the project for assessment work and preparing for job
opportunities. Also, fast and unexpected mine closures can cause tremendous financial stress 
on communities which are accustomed to receive regular payments from mine operations, 
and which fail to prepare for sudden mine closures. For example, the RRDC was unprepared 
for the swift opening of at least 5 mines in the early 1990s and with the falling of metal 
prices, the unexpected closure of these within about 3 years. The RRDDC took advantage of 
those developments through the swift development of different ventures and other business 
opportunities; however, as no emergency measures for sudden mine closures were developed 
the corporation was unable to account for the missing incomes. This resulted in the crash of 
the RRDDC and its associated businesses in 1997-98. Long-term planning for mining 
ventures requires an indigenous community to be highly flexible and dynamic as skills and 
business ventures must be transferable to economic sectors other than mining.
Also, mining operations such as the Faro Mine are reliant on the use of large-scale, 
expensive equipment, which requires their constant use to retrieve the costs. The poor 
punctuality and absenteeism of Ross River Dena employees at the mine site accmed high 
costs on Anvil Range, which in turn limited the success of the IBA. Therefore, it is 
imperative to increase people's understanding of the cost of doing mining business, paired 
with fallback mechanisms in the case of a worker being unable to attend work (e.g. waiting 
list for workers in case of no-shows).
The challenges faced by the community include the lack of professional training, 
formal education and work experience, lack of work ethic and lack of political stability
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within the community. The lack of skills and higher education had huge implications on the 
job levels available to them and employment continuation, which was especially severe at the 
Faro Mine where, aside from the mining liaison position, nobody had higher positions than 
truck driving and simple labouring^ (see above).
The lack of skills and experience had repercussions on the ability to efficiently 
manage the RRDDC. In 1998, Poushinsky Consulting, Whitehorse was asked to prepare a 
Management Review report for the RRDDC, which incorporated an investigation of financial 
matters of the corporation. This report outlines the lack of effective accountability structures. 
Zanasi (1998) stated “important decisions were often made without the formal sanction of the 
Board or shareholders and possibly without their knowledge” (p. 6). Other problems leading 
to the financial difficulties of the corporation were the accumulation of high debts of some of 
the businesses (e.g. Dena Petroleum and Sah Dena Cho Hardware), the failure of charging 
cost recovering prices (e.g. trailers were rented for significantly less than the costs incurred), 
the lack of book keeping for businesses (e.g. Dena Petroleum), and the payment of high 
overhead business costs in times of little business (Zanasi, 1998). Further, funding 
opportunities available through the IB As were not managed properly by the RRDDC. For 
example, YTG paid twice into a training tmst fund to increase Ross River Dena participation 
in the mining activities on their traditional territory. However, the RRDDC was unable to 
provide reports for the monies spent. YTG undertook investigations to trace financial actions 
undertaken by the RRDDC, but this proved impossible because of poor and/or missing data. 
Consequently, the Department of Education rejected subsequent funding to the RRDC.
^  One Ross River D ena member worked at the mine in the human resources departm ent on his own terms 
without being formally recognized as an indigenous person. Thus he is not accounted for in any statistic.
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Further, a challenge repeatedly mentioned throughout the investigations for this study 
is the missing work ethic of Ross River Dena workers, specifically poor punctuality, 
absenteeism and a long-term commitment to employment. Social factors related to this 
challenge are alcohol and drug abuse, and a history of dependency on social assistance 
payments. However, it would be simplistic to reduce poor work ethic to social factors as they 
also include cultural factors, such as the apprehension of many indigenous workers about 
communicating problems with co-workers and supervisors. Instead, people prefer to quit 
work. The RRDC strove to overcome these obstacles through life skill training courses which 
aimed to prepare people for jobs, including building self-esteem and communication skills. 
However, data indicate that these courses were offered too late in the process to truly benefit 
the Ross River Dena members in pursuing and maintaining job opportunities. Instead of 
applying their new skills in the workplace, people experienced the downfall of the local 
economy due to the crash of the mining sector. Additionally, the trend of quitting jobs after a 
few months of work indicates that not all Ross River Dena may be interested in full-time 
employment, but rather appreciate the opportunity to make some cash and then continue on 
with traditional activities, thus merging the traditional and modem sectors of community 
economics.
The lack of political stability of the Ross River Dena First Nation added to the 
complexity of the challenges faced by the community. As a result of the hnancial problems 
faced by the RRDDC in 1997, voices became loud to replace its management. In the same 
year the biannual Council elections took place at which the political leadership of the 
community was almost completely replaced, and because of the strong ties between the 
political and business leaders, the management of the RRDDC too. This had implications on
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the efGcient continuation of business and relationship with the mining operators as new trust 
had to be built between the partners. Furthermore, the contradictions about financial matters 
of the RRDDC and the inability to rebuild a financial history of the corporation contributed 
to tensions within the community and created further economic challenges, such as 
competition of businesses without market support.
Finally, the merging of political and economic ambitions by the RRDC created 
further problems. For example, members of the Council were also decision makers in the 
RRDDC. One interview participant mentioned that it was difficult to ‘change hats’ when 
going from one office to another and to separate political ambitions from the necessities of 
running a successful business. Interview participants from government and industry, as well 
as literature in the field (Wolfe, 2001) underline the importance of separating business from 
politics in order to pursue successful business enterprises.
5.5.3. Industry Related Influences
The sum of industry related influences on the success of IB As can be traced back to 
the companies’ commitment to honour the intent of the IB As, which is mainly to provide 
employment, training and business opportunities to Ross River Dena to allow them to benefit 
from economic activities on their traditional territory. This commitment can be expressed in 
different ways, for example, through respectful and effective communication, considering 
and learning about indigenous communities’ culture and customs, ensuring communities’ 
input into decision-making at the mine site, creating and offering maximum employment, 
training and business opportunities for indigenous community members, and making efforts 
at overcoming challenging situations throughout the IBA process.
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Cominco has demonstrated this commitment. Experienced in working with 
indigenous communities, Cominco made efforts in responding to questions and concerns of 
community members and incorporating these into KZK's design and operation (e.g. 
exploration start and finishing date is dependent upon the migration times of the Finlayson 
caribou herd). Cominco’s commitment to the IBA was further demonstrated in the 
participation of managers and supervisors in cross-cultural training, the completion of a TUS, 
and the steady communication e^orts taken by Cominco with the RRDC/RRDDC to clarify 
obstacles.
In comparison, little effort has been undertaken by Anvil Range to overcome cultural 
differences, and ‘to go the extra mile’ to build a respectful partnership with the RRDC. This 
may have been affected by three factors: the little experience Anvil Range has in working 
with indigenous people as it is a junior company; the negative history the Ross River Dena 
had with the Faro Mine; and the financial difficulties Anvil Range had to face from its start.
5.5.4. Government related Influences
As explained earlier, YTG supported the negotiation of the Faro Mine IBA with 
funding from the Resources Access Negotiation Program, which was not available for the 
negotiation of the KZK agreement. However, as the Faro Mine IBA provided financial 
resources for the negotiation of the KZK IBA, the lack of government funding had no direct 
implications on the success of the IB As. Further, YTG provided funding for economic 
activities resulting flom the IB As of the RRDC/RRDDC with contributions to the training 
trust fund. While this funding contributed to some extend to successful economic activities, 
the funding was provided too late to take fuU advantage of the employment opportunities 
which were available. Aside from the funding for the negotiation of the Faro Mine IBA and
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the contributions to the training fund, the government had no association with the 
relationship of the RRDC with Anvil Range and Cominco. Thus, the influence of 
government on the success of the IBA is very limited, and can be, in the overall scheme of 
things, be neglected.
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Chapter 6 : Conclusion and Recommandations 
Conclusion
The goal of this thesis is to increase the understanding of Impact and Beneûts 
Agreements (IBA) used to increase development of indigenous communities in remote 
regions of well-developed countries. This goal has been achieved through a number of 
objectives: (i) defining and setting criteria for indigenous development, (ii) developing a 
framework for evaluating IBA success in providing benefits to indigenous communities and 
thus in enhancing indigenous development, and (hi) analysing and evaluating two IB As 
negotiated and implemented by a remote indigenous community, and (iv) based on the 
analysis, recommending criteria for the proposed IBA framework which improve the success 
of IB As. This thesis focuses on IB As negotiated directly between indigenous communities 
and industry.
In Chapter 1, indigenous development has been defined as a community-based 
process which lastingly improves peoples’ quality of life from a cultural, social, political and 
economic community point of view. Further, it has been identified that the current focus of 
indigenous communities towards development is a concentration on economic factors which 
are believed to trigger the further development of communities from a political, social and 
cultural point of view. This approach corresponds with modernization theory, which 
anticipates the development of communities through economic means; however, what differs 
is the question of who guides economic decision-making, and thus, which criteria are taken 
into account. An essential part of indigenous economic development is the cooperation of 
indigenous communities and industry to establish ventures which are successful from 
communities’ as well as industry’s point of view.
104
C h u ter 2 introduced one of the tools used to achieve such cooperation: IB As. These 
are arrangements negotiated between indigenous communities (or governments) and 
industries, which aim to mitigate adverse development impacts on indigenous communities 
and their traditional ways of life, their cultures and environments, while providing local short
and long-term benefits to the affected indigenous communities, and thus stimulating their 
economic development. While IB As can be used for different resource development 
ventures, this thesis focused on IB As for large-scale mineral development projects since 
these developments have been identified as being of special importance to the economic 
development of remote indigenous communities.
Despite the high number of IB As negotiated throughout the world, there is only a 
small body of descriptive and analytical IBA literature available, because of the often limited 
time available to people who typically negotiate IB As to publish their experiences, 
confidentiality provisions of the agreements, and the short lifetime of many mining ventures. 
With the exception of work undertaken by O’Faircheallaigh, no framework for the analysis 
of IB As is available. O ’Faircheallaigh ’ s work is recent and focuses specifically on the 
content of IB As. However, this thesis demonstrated that this approach is not sufficient to 
evaluate the success of IB As as the content may not necessarily match the benefits received 
by the community. Hence, this thesis proposes a new general Aamework for the evaluation of 
IB As. This framework is based on work undertaken by O'Faircheallaigh, and is expanded 
through the use of additional IBA literature and knowledge gained through the case studies. 
The framework determines the main factors for successful IB As, such as content and process, 
as well as additional factors, such as those related to the community, government, industry
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and the project itself. This framework is broad, as no initial criteria for the different elements 
of the framework are available.
A first attempt to develop such criteria has been undertaken for the purpose of this
thesis as it analysed two IB As negotiated by the Ross River Dena; a small indigenous group 
located in a remote part of the Yukon Territory. In the 1990s, the RRDC negotiated several 
IB As for resource development projects on their traditional territory, including the Faro Mine 
and KZK Mine agreements. These two IB As were chosen for analysis because of their 
importance to the community. Chapter 3 introduced the methodologies used to pursue the 
research project, such as the study design, and the methods for data gathering and analysis. 
The case studies were introduced in Chapter 4. Further, the chapter illuminated the 
challenges to an exact analysis of the IB As, such as their short lifetime (about three years), 
confidentiality clauses of one of the agreements, the lack of accessible documentation from 
the community, governments and industry about the IB As’ processes and benefits, and the 
hesitation of some people involved in the negotiation and implementation of the IB As to 
participate in the study. While these challenges limited the analysis of the IBAs (Chapter 5), 
they also outlined the complications involved in studying IBAs.
Recommendations
Despite these challenges, it was possible to identify a number of limiting as well as 
encouraging criteria for successful IBAs and offer recommendations for future IBA 
negotiations and implementation of the RRDC. These recommendations have been 
categorized according to the IBA framework into process, content and additional influences.
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# Develop a set of community goals before negotiating an agreement as this fosters 
community involvement with the IBA, and offers a reference tool to communicate the
negotiating achievements to the community.
# Carry out studies which investigate the socio-economic impacts of the proposed 
project, and document the heritage artefacts and use of the area.
» Make sure that the community understands and accepts the negotiated agreements 
before signing it.
• Establish effective communication processes between the negotiating team and 
community to keep communities constantly involved in the process. If community 
participation in meetings is low, find different ways to keep people involved, such as 
going from house to house to talk to people.
• Focus implementation efforts on the provision of benefits for the membership.
« Keep effective and ongoing communication between the indigenous community and 
industry to improve relations and create understanding for each others concerns and 
limitations.
Co/ifgni
Ensure that the agreement contains provisions for:
* employment, business, training and advanced education opportunities;
# cross-cultural training of the non-indigenous (i.e. learning about indigenous history 
and culture) and indigenous workforce (i.e. Life Skills training, learning about needs 
of mining business);
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# a mining liaison officer position which strictly focuses on the integration of 
indigenous community members into the workforce, training and other educational 
programs;
# the consideration and use of Traditional Knowledge in the design and execution of 
the project;
# the participation of the indigenous community in the monitoring of direct and indirect
environmental, social and economic impacts by the mining development; and
# effective communication and dispute resolution processes which foster a positive 
partnership between the indigenous group, industry and government.
Additional Influences
Project related influences
# Be prepared for the short lifespan of a mine. Do not exaggerate the creation of 
businesses associated with the mining development.
Community related influences
# Separate business and political goals and objectives.
# Prepare community members for positive as well as negative socio-economic effects 
of the mine. Offer training that prepares community members for mining activities. 
Investigate which areas of employment and business are transferable to other business 
sectors, and thus, foster long-term benefits from the development.
# Require community members to join an orientation which teaches prepares 
community members for successful participation in a mining workforce.
# Keep open and effective communication with industry and government to foster 
positive partnerships.
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Industry related influences
* Commit to the success of the IBA.
# Seek the input of indigenous people in the design and management of the mine.
* Keep communicating with the community on all aspects of the mining venture with 
relevance to the indigenous community.
* Require from the workforce participating in cross-cultural training with the goal to
minimise conflicts and increase the understanding between the indigenous and non- 
indigenous workforce.
• Employ the mining liaison officer to advance the employment and training of the 
indigenous workforce and increase the overall capacities of the community.
Government related influences
• Create incentives for industry (e.g. legislation) to foster the negotiation of IBAs to 
increase indigenous participation in large-scale mining ventures.
• Make available sufficient funding for indigenous communities to participate 
meaningfully in IBA negotiations.
# Fb-ovide assistance for capacity building before project start-up to allow for 
maximization of benefits sought through indigenous community members.
This study demonstrates that the single most important criterion for successful IBAs 
is the commitment the different parties bring to the negotiation and implementation of the 
IBA. This seems to be especially true for indigenous groups that have not completed land 
claims and, thus, are not supported by government regulations in their quest to steer 
development on their traditional lands. Given the lack of legislative support, indigenous
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groups are highly dependent upon the good will industry brings to a project. Thus, one of the 
key questions is how commitment from industry can be achieved. One prerequisite is the 
respect by industry of cultural differences between the indigenous and non-indigenous 
communities, and an understanding of the interest indigenous people have in the protection 
of their land base and their communities. Further, it takes organisation and responsibility 
from the indigenous group to demonstrate a willingness to cooperate with industry on issues 
such as indigenous employment and training, and the protection of the environment and 
cultural sites. Cooperation between industry and indigenous communities cannot be created 
without trust; however, this trust is not easily achieved but is the product of a constant effort 
to engage in communication and openness about each other’s challenges and limitations.
This study indicates that senior companies, such as Cominco, seem to be willing to take extra 
efforts to make the agreement work. This increased effort can be attributed to the need of 
major companies to practice corporate responsibility in order to increase market 
compatibility and avoid conflict. The study further indicates that junior companies, which 
struggle with basic financing of their operations, are less inclined (or are even unable) to 
demonstrate commitment towards the development of indigenous communities affected by 
their mining operations.
Development of indigenous communities through large-scale resource development 
ventures such as mining projects is difficult to predict because of factors such as mineral 
prices, the viability of a company and political pressure. The resulting patterns of boom and 
bust are challenging to the economic development of indigenous communities in Alaska, and 
northern regions of Australia, Canada and Russia. Further, given the relatively short time of 
indigenous peoples being involved directly in the development of their communities,
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development will not be achieved instantly nor strategically structured. Black Knippers 
(1999) states "real development, of the sort we are calling empowerment, wiU never be neat 
and orderly and predictable. For better or worse, consequences do not derive directly from 
any identifiable constellation of motives. But the same uncertainty that makes development 
work so frustrating also makes it intriguing, challenging and promising" (p. 267). IBAs are 
but one means to strive for development. In the past 10 years, indigenous development has 
steadily increased and taken different avenues. Currently, one of the largest projects pursued 
by indigenous peoples in Canada is the proposed Mackenzie Valley Pipeline. Facilitated by 
the completion of land claim agreements, indigenous communities along the proposed path 
have built partnerships and established joint ventures to maximize the benefits anticipated 
from the project. In the 1970s, Berger (1977) stated that land claim negotiations must be 
resolved and control be given to indigenous peoples to determine their own future in order to 
achieve viable business ventures in the Canadian North while protecting the land base for the 
indigenous population. The next decades will demonstrate if these predictions are correct and 
if indigenous development can be achieved that leads to socially, environmentally and 
economically viable indigenous communities.
Future Research
This thesis presents a new framework with an initial set of criteria for successful 
IBAs. However, as these criteria are based on the analysis of only two agreements negotiated 
by one indigenous community, more studies of this kind must be performed in order to verify 
the framework and expand on the criteria presented in the study. This task is challenging as 
such research projects demand extensive field work in terms of the variety of data sources
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and the length of the study process^^, as well as the restrictions that confidentiality clauses 
put on access to, and publishing of, information. Moreover, analysing IBAs is complicated 
because of the high number of variables (outside influences and variances in process and 
content).
This research project focused specifically on IBAs negotiated between two specific 
parties: an indigenous community and industry; hence, no regard has been given to the 
influence other players would bring to the negotiating table. Besides an investigation of 
increased stakeholder participation on the success of IBAs, questions arise about the effects 
governmental regulations could have on improving and clarifying the negotiating and 
implementation of IBAs for indigenous communities without land claim settlements. While 
this question is of little concern to indigenous communities in Alaska, the title to land of 
indigenous peoples in Australia, Canada and Russia is less certain.
Finally, current research on IBAs concentrates strongly on the provision of economic 
benefits to communities. However, in accordance with indigenous development theory, 
economic development steered through IBAs must ultimately lead to successful social and 
environmental community development. Therefore, it is essential to investigate if and how 
IBAs are actively promoting community well-being, and how this process can be improved 
to guarantee the development of healthy and culturally vibrant indigenous communities.
It can take more than a decade from  the initiation to a point in tim e where one can analyze the long-term 
benefits o f an agreement on the community.
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Appendix 1.1. Principles of the Four Worlds International Institute
Four strategic foundation principles of the Four Worlds International Institute are:
1. Development comes Aom within: others may help, but the driving force for change, 
healing, growth and progress must come from within the communities themselves.
2. No vision, no development: the people need to be able to visualize health and well- 
being for themselves in order to be able to create it in the world.
Individual and community transformations must go hand in hand: the healing, 
learning and growth of individuals, and the transformation of community 
relationships and conditions are mutually interdependent.
3. Holistic learning is the key to deep and lasting change: learning is at the heart of 
sustainable change processes. Human beings are multi-dimensional learning beings, 
physically, emotionally, intellectually, spiritually and volitionally.
4. The elders' worldview holds that the spiritual and material are inseparable and 
interdependent, that everything is related to everything, that healing (self, community, 
nation, earth) depends on our capacity to understand ourselves, and that humans are 
gifted by the Creator with the power to transform and heal the world.
(directly quoted from Croal & Darou, 2002, p.9 )
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Appendix 1.2. Common principles for indigenous development
Common principles for indigenous development identified by participants of the conference
"Native self-reliance, renewal and development" held in Vancouver, August 19-24, 1984.
"1. Control [of development] should be vested in the local community for directing its 
own planning process to ensure relevance to local needs, circumstances, and 
aspirations. ...
2. Top-down decentralization of planning control from government is complemented by 
bottom-up participation of all community groups throughout the planning process. ...
3. Bands and tribes often need outside technical assistance. However, much work can be 
done by the communities themselves with suitable trained planning staff to research 
and analyze resource market opportunities. Where specialized expertise is required 
from outside, it should be controlled by the community.
4. Development planning should integrate all the strategies for decision-making, 
community organizing, and technical assistance described above. ...
5. Planning at the local level should be facilitated rather than controlled by government. 
The Federal Government can improve the climate for bands and tribes to undertake 
their own development planning by transferring programs responsibilities, providing 
block funding, and removing legal and policy impediments. Government should 
provide support for bands when they negotiate with provincial/state agencies and the 
private sector...., government's own strategic and program planning should be 
responsive to Indian planning ...".
(Sinclair, 1985)
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Appendix 2.1. General Content of Impact and BeneAts Agreements negotiated in Canada
1. Introductory Provisions
Proamhle and Recitals
Purpose
Dciinitions
Identification o f Parties and Specification o f  Beneficiaries
Ciuning into Effect o f  the Agreement
Term  of Agreem ent
Overall Description o f the Project
Project Phases
Aboriginal Support fw  the Project
2. Employment and Training 
General Employment Provisions
Identification o f Em ploym ent Opportunities and Labour Supply
l.alxmr Force Development Plan
Em ploym ent-Related Com munity Outreach
Recruitment and Hiring
Em ploym ent Preferences
On The-Ioh and other Training
Contracting and Subcontracting
AMwenticeship Programs
Educational and Scholarship Program s
Employee Evaluation aix) Advancement
Labour Relations and Discipline
W(*k Rotations and Vacations
Transportation
Work Site Conditions -  Accommtxlation, Fond and Recreation
Counselling and Em ployee Support 
Language o f  Work 
Cross-Cultural Issues 
Restrictions on Employees
Com mittee on Em ploym ent Opportunities and Issues 
Aboriginal En^loym ent Cooidinator 
Evaluation of Aboriginal Employment
3. Economic Development and Business Opportunities
General Provisions Regarding Contracting and Business ()|q)orlunities
Identification o f Businesses and Business Opportunities 
General Preferences for Aboriginal Businesses
Procedure for Securing Contract Goods and Services on a Com petitive Basis 
Unbundling' o f  Contract o f  Contract Requirements 
M onitoring o f Contracting 
Assistance for Local Business Development 
Research and Development 
Rij^t of Hrst Refusal on Equipment and Properly
Committee on Econom ic and Business Development__________ ____________
123
4. Social, Coltnral and Community Support 
Communicalion and Cunsultaiion
Social and Com m unity Assistance -  Counselling 
Community PmjecW and Physical Inlrastrucfure 
A boriginal Cultural and Econom ic Activities 
Monitoring of Social Inmacts
5. Financial Provisions and Equity Participation 
Rationales for Cash Payments
Fixed Cash Payments 
Variable Cash payments 
Suspension o f Payments 
Development and Remedial 1 und 
A djustm ents for Inflation 
Tax Implications 
Com pensation Provisions 
Security Deposit
Equity Interests and Joint Ventures
Expenses for Administration, Management and Implementation o f  the IBA
Reim bursem ent o f Negotiation Expenses
6. Environmental Protection and Cultural Resources 
(ieneral Provisions Regarding Environmental Compliances
Specific Environm ental Protection and M onitoring Provisions 
Wildlife
A bandonm ent and Reclam ation
Protection o f  Cultural Resources and Areas of Cultural Significance
7. Other Substantive and Procedural Provisions 
Amendment and Renegotiation o f  the Agreement
Anticipation o f project Expansion and other Projects o f Activities
Confidentiality and Release o f  Infwmation
Im plem entation Committee
Annual Reporting on Agreement implementation
Formal Evaluation o f the Agreem ent
Dispute Resolution
Enforceability and Remedies
'Boilerplate' Contractual Provisions
(Kennett, 1999a)
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Appendix 2.2. Schedule 26-1 of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement 
Matters considered appropriate for Inuit benefits 
(Section 26.3.1)
1. Inuit training at all levels.
2. Inuit preferential hiring.
3. Employment rotation reflecting Inuit needs and preferences.
4. Scholarships.
5. Labour relations.
6. Business opportunities for Inuit including:
(a) provision of seed capital;
(b) provision of expert advice;
(c) notification of business opportunities;
(d) preferential contracting practices.
7. Housing, accommodation and recreation.
8. Safety, health and hygiene.
9. Language of workplace.
10. Identification, protection and conservation of archaeological sites and specimens.
11. Research and development.
12. Inuit access to facilities constructed for the project such as airfields and roads.
13. Particularly important Inuit environmental concerns and disruption of wildlife, 
including wildlife disruption compensation schemes.
14. Outpost camps.
1 2 2
15. Information flow and interpretation, including liaison between Inuit and proponent 
regarding project management and Inuit participation and concerns.
16. Relationship to prior and subsequent agreements.
17. Co-ordination with other developments.
18. Arbitration and amendment provisions.
19. Implementation and enforceability, including performance bonds and liquidated
damages clauses.
20. Obligations of subcontractors.
21. Any other matters that the Parties consider to be relevant to the needs of the project 
and Inuit.
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Appendix 2.3. Federal Russian regulation regarding resources development
The Decree CoMceming C/rggnt MgajMrgj/br Frotgcting Ecomo/nic
Activity q/'t/ic Native Minority FeopZcf q/^t/ic NortA issued on April 22, 1992 sets out
1 ) the ministers o f the republics are directed to,
a) define the territories o f traditional land use that are part o f their 
national heritage and which cannot be alienated without their 
consent for industrial or other developm ent which is not connected 
to traditional econom y;
b) to transfer w ithout cost to kinship communities and families 
belonging to the native minorities o f the north those lands 
associated with traditional econom y for a lifelong, inheritable 
ow nership or leasing;
c) to give priority rights to make agreem ents and receive licenses for 
the use o f renewable natural resources to kinship com m unities and 
fam ilies belonging to the native minorities of the north;
d) to define traditional territories in order to effect there sustainable 
resource development; and
2) to the governm ent o f the Russian Federation, to work out a 
regulatory system for the use o f lands and resources on the traditional 
territories o f the peoples o f the North only with the approval of 
environm ental expertise.
(W iget & Balalaeva, 1997, f  20)
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Appendix 2.4. 'Cape York Model' for M^or Project Negotiations
Stage 1:
Stage 2:
Initiation of Process
Creation of Framework
Steering Committee 
CYLC Negotiating Team
Memorandum of Understanding
Stage 3;
Stage 4:
Information Collection and Community Consultation
Anthropological Work 
(membership of Steering Committee confirmed or adjusted)
Economic & Social Impact Assessment (ESIA)
(ESIA Report feeds into statutory project approval process)
Other Studies
Establishing of Aboriginal Negotiating Position
Stage 5: Negotiating Process
Stage 6:
Stage?:
Endorsement and Signing of Agreement
Implementation
(O'Faircheallaigh, 2(XX))
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Appendix 3.1. Questionnaire for Partly Structured Interviews
Questionnaire for Process Pardcipants 
Success
How would you describe the purpose of a socio-economic agreement?
How do you think one can recognize a successful socio-economic agreement?
Do you consider the socio-economic agreements with Anvil Range and Teck Cominco to 
be successful or non-successful?
What do you think are the factors for the success or non-success of these agreements? 
Can you tell me why?
Process
The process of negotiating agreements generally is described in literature as consisting of 
different steps;
Start/ Initiation
Information gathering
Negotiation
Implementation
Monitoring
I
Evaluation
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Using this diagram, can you describe to me the process used by the Ross River Dena to 
negotiate the KZK and Faro Mine socio-economic agreement? If you have not taken part 
in all of the steps, please tell me about the steps you have been involved with.
What were the goals and objectives of the Ross River Dena community for the socio­
economic agreements with Anvil Range and Teck Cominco?
How have these goals and objectives of the Ross River Dena been determined? 
How did the Ross River Dena try to achieve these goals and objectives?
Could you please comment on how the community has been involved in negotiating the 
socio-economic agreements?
How important do you think is the process used to negotiate a socio-economic agreement 
for the actual success of this agreement?
Content
Do you think that the content of the socio-economic agreements reflected the goals and 
objectives of the community for the Kudz Ze Rayah and the Faro Mine Project? Can you 
tell me why you think so?
Do you think the content of the socio-economic agreements was sufficient to provide 
long-term benefits from resource development for the Ross River Dena community?
How important do you think is the content used to negotiate a socio-economic agreement 
for the actual success of this agreement?
Conclusion
Do you think socio-economic agreements are a suitable tool for providing benefits from 
resource development for the Ross River Dena? Please teU me why you think so.
If you had no financial or legal limitations, how would you approach resource 
development in order to benefit your community members?
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yes □ no
yes □ no
yes □ no
female □ male
□ 55-64 o 65-74
Appendix 3.2. Survey for Ross River Dena Community Members 
Questionnaire for Ross River Communitv Members
ZfMporkmt. 7b anfwgr tAe gwgftio/M m art rig/it .ÿ^ware
Are you a Ross River community member? o
Are you Ross River Dena? o
If no, are you member of another aboriginal group? o 
Sex: o
Age group: □ 24-34 □ 35-44 □ 45-54
Did you live in Ross River (or Faro) during the following years?
□ 1994 □ 1995 □ 1996 □ 1997 □ 1998
1.a) Which beneûts did you get through the Em k Ze ÆayaA Socio-economic Agreement?
□ none □ job □ training/apprenticeship □ scholarships
□ trapper support □ business opportunities □ others .......... .............
Lb) Which benefits did you get through the Anvil Range Socio-economic Agreement? 
o none o job o training o scholarships
o trapper support o business opportunities o others .............................................
2.a) When and for how long did you work for the Æmfz Ze ÂayaA Mine?
Year for how long what kind of job
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2.b) When and for how long did you work for the fa ro  Mine? (between 1994-1998)
Year for how long what kind of job
3.a) When and which business opportunities did you get through the Kudz Ze Kayah 
Socio-economic Agreement?
Year what kind of business
3.b) When and which business opportunities did you get through the Anvil Range Socio­
economic Agreement?
Year what kind of business
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4.a) In how many on-job training/off-job training/apprenticeship programs did you 
participate organized by Tect ComtMco?
On-job training program 
O one
□ 2 
□  3
O 4 and more
off-job training program 
o one
□ 2
□ 3
□ 4 and more
apprenticeship program
□ one
□ 2
□ 3
□ 4 and more
4.b) In how many on-job training/off-job training/apprenticeship programs did you 
participate organized by Anvil Range U d .l
On-job training program
□  one
□ 2
□  3
□  4 and more
off-job training program
□ one
□ 2
□ 3
□ 4 and more
apprenticeship program
□ one
□ 2
□ 3
□ 4 and more
5.a) For how many semesters did you receive scholarship money from Teck Cominco ?
□  1 semester
□  2 semesters
□  3 semesters
□  4 semesters
□  5 semesters
□  6 and more semesters
5.b) For how many semesters did you receive scholarship money from Anvil ikrngf fAf. ?
O 1 semester 
□  2 semesters 
O 3 semesters 
O 4 semesters 
O 5 semesters 
O 6 and more semesters
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6.a) On a scale from 1 to 5 please tell me if the Amk Ze AioyaA Socio-economic 
Agreement gave enough beneGts for the Ross River Dena community members?
Not at all fair Yes, very much I do not know
1 2 3 4 5
□ □ □ □ □ □
6.b) On a scale from 1 to 5, please tell me if the fw o  Mine Socio-economic Agreement 
gave enough beneGts for the Ross River Dena community members?
Not at all fair Yes, very much I do not know
1 2 3 4 5
□ □ □ o □ □
7.a) On a scale from 1-5, please tell me if you had an opportunity to discuss concerns and 
wishes related to the Kudz Ze Kayah Project when it was negotiated?
Not at all fair Yes, very much I do not know
1 2 3 4 5
□ □ □ □ □ □
7.b) On a scale from 1-5, please tell me if you had an opportunity to discuss concerns and 
wishes related to the Faro Mine Project when it was negoGated?
Not at all fair Yes, very much I do not know
1 2 3 4 5
□ □ □ □ □ □
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).) What would you negotiate for future socio-economic agreements with resource 
companies?
9.) Which are important values which should guide resource developments on Ross River 
Dena traditional territory?
Do you have any further question or comment?
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Appendix 3.3. Wage comparison of a Ross River Dena working at Faro and KZK 
Faro Mine
Working conditions: Shift work -  4 days on, 4 days off
switch between day and night shifts 
Position: Pit Labourer
Wage: $15 per hour/ $2655 per month
Costs (for stay in Faro):
Taxes $800
Rent $350
Utilities $150
Food $200
Travel Ross River/Faro $80
Wages minus Costs: $1,075 per month
KZK Mine -  Contract by Expatriate Resources Ltd. (1996)
Working conditions: 21 days on, 21 days off (to allow for job sharing)
Position: Geophysical Assistant
Wages: $120 per day/ $1,680 per month
KZK Mine - Contract by Expatriate Resources Ltd. (1997)
Working conditions: 6 weeks on, 1 week off 
Position: Geophysical Assistant
Wage: $120 per day/ $3,780 per month
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Appendix 4.1. Businesses of the RRDDC counted in 1998
1) Businesses managed and operated by the RRDDC 
o Ross River Dena Development Corporation
o Trading Post 
o Dena Petroleum 
o Laundromat 
o Canada Post Contract 
o Fire Fighting Crews 
o Trailers 
o RV Park 
o Daycare 
o Sewage pumpouts
2) Joint Ventures where the operation is managed by the Joint Venture partner 
o Pacific Dena Transport
o Sah Cho Hardware 
o Expediting 
o Mbizeh-Norcan
3) Administration related to agreements/contracts with mining companies 
o Anvil Range
o Cominco
o Boliden (Westmin Resources) 
o Expatriate Resources 
o Atna Resources 
o YGC Resources 
o Columbia Gold
4) Administration of funding under government programs, 
o Centenial Anniversaries Program (RV Park construction) 
o Fire fighting training
(Zanasi, 1998, 2)
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Appendix 5.1. Evaluation of female versus male responses to satisfaction of benefits
received through Impact and Benefits Agreements
Figure 6: q/'tAg /(ivgr Dena witA receiveff tAmwgA ATWz Zg
/mpoct nmf Bgne/ît.y Agreement
14
f 1?
«-0 10
B" sas
o 6k
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z 2
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Figure 7: Satisfaction o f the Ross River Dena with benefits received through Faro Mine 
Impact omf Agreement
□  Female
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Appendix 5.2. Ross River Dena evaluation of their input to the negotiation of the Impact
and Benefits Agreements
Figure 8: Ro.;.; River Dena evaiwation q/'t/ieir inpwt to tAe negotiation o/ t^Ae Faro Mine 
an^f Rad!z Ze Raya/i Agreement.^
a  80% ,
S 50%
§  20%
a  Faro Mine 
«KZK
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